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Wednesday, 18 November 2026

Psychosis and the Question of Belonging in the Racialised Worlds

In this week's post, Jae Ryeong Sul introduce's his ongoing project about psychosis, race, and belonging.

Abstract graphic of multiple head in silhouette
Belonging is an everyday part of our life. We belong to communities, families, professions, places, and nations. Some forms of belonging are given to us by birth, others are acquired by choice. Some stay with us for much of our life, others are as temporary as any other emotions. And, not all belonging is comfortable! We can belong to a place or group without feeling at home there. Imagine, for example, going back to your home country after decades of living elsewhere. We can also slowly grow suspicious of an organisation of which we remain an active member after being targets of/or witnessing ostracisation. Lastly, and interestingly, some forms of belonging remain in the background and do not come to our attention until someone questions our place, which may prompt this nagging question of ‘Do I really belong here? Have I ever?’

Racialisation can permeate these different forms of belonging. This is especially important for ethnoracial minorities living in white-majority societies, where racialisation can be dispersed across different aspects of everyday life. In one context, this can take the form of resisting the racial meanings attached to one’s visible identity; in another, it may involve accentuating them despite their stereotype. These ways of securing one’s place in the world are, of course, influenced by many everyday interactions. We see how our siblings, parents, or relatives are treated in the public, and how they have responded to practical social expectations and/or institutional demands imposed upon them. Growing up, we see our peers code switching around authority figures and get to learn when certain parts of our identity can be downplayed or emphasised.  In other words, living as an ethnoracial minority involves navigating the racial meanings others attribute to one’s visible identity and negotiating what they imply for one’s standing across shifting social situations.

My new Wellcome-funded project, Psychosis and the Question of Belonging in Racialised Worlds, brings this everyday reality of racialised belonging into the study of racism and psychosis. Epidemiological research has already documented elevated rates of psychosis in ethnoracial minority populations in white-majority countries, and psychosocial research has examined how social factors such as discrimination and other forms of adversity contribute to these disparities. Building on this, my project starts from a simple point. Discrimination does not happen to an individual in isolation but to someone who has already learned ways of understanding themselves, relating to others, and securing a place within a racialised social world. Belonging, here, provides a useful entry point for symmetrically exploring how social adversity is experienced against this background and how it may contribute to vulnerability to psychosis. Without attention to this lived reality, justified wariness towards white-majority institutions, grounded in the histories of discrimination and mistreatment, can be very difficult to distinguish from psychopathology. At the same time, the experiences of discrimination may remain emotionally and epistemically difficult to be even talked about in clinical contexts, which risks going unheard.

With these concerns in view, I take a phenomenological orientation and focus on racialised belonging, articulating what it consists in, how it is maintained, and when it becomes a point of vulnerability. Drawing on first-person narratives, memoirs, archival materials, and existing research on racism and psychosis, I will explore these questions across different histories and social positions. Further, engagement with community organisations and practitioner networks will help refine the emerging framework through the perspectives of those who have lived through and worked with these issues. In doing so, I hope this project can provide a new conceptual orientation for discussing the pressing issue of racism and psychosis that is grounded closely in the everyday worlds in which belonging is lived, negotiated, and, at times, begins to break apart.

Author Bio

Picture of the author
Jae Ryeong Sul is a Senior Research Associate in Philosophy at the University of Bristol, working on the Wellcome Early Career Award Psychosis and the Question of Belonging in Racialised Worlds [ref. [344455/Z/26Z]. He studies phenomenology and issues related to mental illness for its better understanding, care, and treatment.

Wednesday, 11 November 2026

New EPIC Research Fellow: Introducing Anna Golova

In this post, Anna Golova introduces her existing research, and her new work with EPIC at Birmingham.

Anna Golova


1. What is your main research interest?


I work in the philosophy of psychiatry, and my main research interests concern the relationship between mental illness, identity, and agency. My recent research has focused on the phenomenon of ‘self-illness ambiguity’, which is expressed in questions that people with mental health conditions sometimes ask, such as ‘Is it me or my illness?’, or that others around them might ask, such as ‘Is that their illness talking?’.

I have especially been focusing on ‘agential self-illness ambiguity’, one of the forms of self-illness ambiguity that Roy Dings and I have discussed in two papers, one primarily philosophical, the other more clinically oriented. Agential self-illness ambiguity – at least on the surface – concerns questions of whether certain thoughts, feelings, or actions are attributable to a person or to their mental illness.

I am interested in how we should make sense of such questions and what is at stake in asking and answering them, both in everyday interpersonal relationships and in clinical contexts. My research challenges the assumption that we can or should answer such questions by exclusively attributing thoughts, feelings, or actions either to the person or to their illness. The answer might be ‘both’. Moreover, attributing something to an illness does not, by itself, settle normative questions (e.g., regarding autonomy or responsibility). And sometimes, the underlying concern may not be about drawing a boundary between self and illness at all. Instead, we should investigate the more specific concerns underlying people’s self-illness ambiguity questions. 


2. Why do you think it is important to study epistemic injustice in healthcare?


I find it particularly important to study the connections between self-illness ambiguity and epistemic injustice in healthcare. One connection concerns clinicians who might unfairly dismiss a service user’s testimony based on the presumption that ‘that’s the illness talking’.

Another connection is that service users’ self-illness ambiguity utterances may sometimes express their own doubts about whether they can trust their epistemic capacities. Such uncertainty may hinder epistemic agency, but asking such questions might also be an important exercise of epistemic agency through critical self-reflection.

Oversimplified assumptions about mental illness as something entirely separate from the person may also constrain service users’ interpretative resources for understanding themselves and their agency. At the same time, philosophers should be careful not to dismiss service user statements such as ‘It’s not me; it’s my illness’ as relying on conceptually confused assumptions about the relationship between mental illness and the self. Instead, taking service users seriously as knowers requires investigating the meaningful concerns (e.g., about responsibility) that might underlie such statements. 

Ultimately, I think that studying these interconnected issues is important for attending to service users’ efforts to understand themselves and be understood by others, as well as for shaping mental healthcare practices in ways that support such understanding. 


3. What are you working on right now?


Having recently submitted my PhD thesis, ‘Mental Illness and the Self: Ambiguity and Agency’, at Oxford, I am currently preparing another of its chapters for publication. In this paper, I argue that many questions about whether someone’s thoughts, feelings, or actions are attributable to the person or their illness are better understood as questions about the person’s agential capacities, especially those relevant to responsibility.

In my new role as a postdoctoral research fellow on project EPIC at Birmingham, I am also beginning to develop research on how the concept of self-illness ambiguity might help us not only identify but also address forms of epistemic injustice in mental healthcare. I am particularly interested in examining how service users’ uncertainty about their own epistemic capacities might interact with the epistemic injustices they may experience in interpersonal and institutional contexts.

I'm excited to explore these questions together with Lisa Bortolotti, Matthew Broome, and the rest of the wonderful EPIC team!

 

Anna Golova is a postdoctoral research fellow on project EPIC at the University of Birmingham. She recently submitted her DPhil thesis ‘Mental Illness and the Self: Ambiguity and Agency’ at the University of Oxford, where she has been based at the Uehiro Oxford Institute. Before this, she completed the BPhil in Philosophy at Oxford. Her research interests lie in the philosophy of psychiatry.

Wednesday, 4 November 2026

Mechanical Epistemic Injustice

 In this post, Coreen McGuire adapts her concept of mechanical epistemic injustice to the Post Office/Horizon scandal. 

Red postbox and telephone box side by side
Image credit: 'Boxes, Kimpton, Hampshire', by Mike Cattell.

A harrowing scene in the ITV drama, ‘Mr Bates vs. the Post Office’, depicts Mr Lee Castleton, a Sub-Postmaster accused of stealing money from the Post Office, arguing in court that he hasn’t done anything of the sort. Rather, faulty Fujitsu’s Horizon software is creating imaginary deficits. Desperate to be believed, he asserts that the ‘system produces them out of nowhere’. Against his testimony, an expert maintains that no evidence suggests any problems with the computer software. The viewer and Mr Castleton both know that he was in fact correct, but he is not believed. The objectivity of the software is venerated, and elevated above his testimony. The show’s depiction of the visceral unfairness of this created public outrage that has sparked a public inquiry and attempts to redress victims — sadly still ongoing. The specific way that the victims of the Postmaster scandal were wronged exemplifies a type of mechanical epistemic injustice in which technologies are used to disenfranchise knowers.

In my 2020 book, Measuring Difference, Numbering Normal, I coined the term ‘mechanical epistemic injustice’ to describe how the objectivity associated with technology is valued over and above individuals’ claims about their own health. Following Miranda Fricker’s 2007 account of epistemic injustice, mechanical epistemic injustice extends this theory to denote how people are harmed when technologies are accredited undue epistemic credibility. My book considers hearing loss and breathlessness, intimate and invisible experiences that have historically been associated with malingering and disbelief. Considering the technologies that have been used to make these personal experiences legible and compensable reveals that such tools have also been used to deny personal experiences of disability. And a long view of the Post Office emphasises how wielding mechanical epistemic injustice has historically allowed institutions to avoid making changes to their systems. 

In the interwar era, the nationalised Post Office used a device called the artificial ear to set the standards for normal hearing that their telephones were tested against. By equating idealised hearing with average hearing, they artificially elevated this standard and created a new cohort of ‘hard-of-hearing’ subscribers, who had to pay increased monthly rental for a ‘telephone for the deaf’ service. Despite not experiencing significant problems with hearing loss in other areas of their lives and despite protesting that the problems were systemic, these subscribers were told that any problems they had were due to their individual hearing loss, not the Post Office technology. Pathocentric epistemic injustice linked to their disability intersected with mechanical epistemic injustice to effectively silence these subscribers.

The example of the spirometer clarifies how mechanical epistemic injustice perpetrates harms in healthcare settings. The spirometer is a device designed to make a ‘proxy’ measure of lung capacity by estimating ‘vital capacity’. It ‘corrects’ for various individual variables that may impact on lung capacity, including demographic factors whose health effects have long been disputed. The elevation of contentious individual factors like sex or race or class, has worked to obscure the impact of environmental factors on lung function and locate the responsibility for health within the individual rather than in the environmental conditions surrounding them, such as pollution or poverty or industrial conditions. This meant that for groups whose work impacted on their lung function – like miners – the spirometer became central to the perpetuation of mechanical epistemic injustice. Miners knew that the dust they were inhaling was making them ill, but tools like the spirometer failed to recognise their disability and were used to justify withholding compensation from certain affected individuals.

Mechanical epistemic injustice is an especially useful way to think about the harms that were visited on the sub-postmasters through the British Post Office Scandal because it can help us think more clearly about responsibility when machines are used to replace human thinking. Thinking about the limits of technological agency and paying attention to the way it was mobilised to apportion blame and then to avoid responsibility means mechanical epistemic injustice can clarify the real responsibilities and culpabilities of both Fujitsu and key individuals working in the Post Office.


References

  • Braun, L., Breathing Race into the Machine: The Surprising Career of the Spirometer from Plantation to Genetics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014).
  • Flinders, K. (2024). ‘Post Office Horizon scandal explained: Everything you need toknow’. Computer Weekly. Accessed August 2026.
  • Fricker, M, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
  • McGuire, C., Measuring difference, numbering normal: Setting the standards for disability in the interwar period. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2020)
  • McGuire, C. (2019). ‘X-rays don’t tell lies’: the Medical Research Council and the measurement of respiratory disability, 1936–1945. The British Journal for the History of Science, 52(3), 447-465.

Coreen McGuire is Associate Professor in Twentieth-Century British History at Durham University. She is the author of Measuring Difference, Numbering Normal: Setting the standards for disability in the interwar period and co-editor of Epidemiological Obfuscation: Historical and Contemporary Case Studies. Her current research focuses on the development of categories used to organise data to measure disability and this work is supported by a Wellcome University Award. She is co-editor of the Disability History series for Manchester University Press and leads ‘The Measurement Lab’ at Durham University’s Institute for Medical Humanities.




Wednesday, 28 October 2026

Like and Dislike in Chronic Fatigue Syndrome

In the final blog in our series on like and dislike, Hugh Robertson-Ritchie meditates on the problem of certainty in mutual tensions between doctors and patients with Chronic Fatigue. 

Doctor speaking to patient; he has a serious or stern expression.

Many CFS/ME (chronic fatigue syndrome/myalgic encephalomyopathy) patients dislike their doctors, and many doctors dislike their CFS/ME patients.  Why is this so?  CFS/ME patients’ dislike of doctors follows from the wrong that is being done when these patients are subjected to inappropriate deficits of doctors’ credence.  This wrong is towards these patients’ capacities as knowers regarding their testimony concerning the severity and the deleterious effects of their CFS/ME symptoms, and their understanding of the causes of these symptoms.  Miranda Fricker sees such wrongs as testimonially and hermeneutically unjust. Concomitantly, some doctors dislike those CFS/ME patients who reject their advice about the widely-recommended medical treatments of psychological and exercise therapies for CFS/ME.  In this blog, I give evidence for these dislikes, and argue that they can be explained by major (although under-acknowledged) uncertainties concerning CFS/ME, compounded by people’s differing and oppositional responses to those uncertainties.

What is CFS/ME?  People with a CFS/ME diagnosis usually suffer the symptoms that include excessive fatigue, especially following exertion, for a long time, sometimes for decades.  The symptoms of CFS/ME often greatly interfere with many aspects of people’s lives – work, family life, and social life.  A significant proportion  of CFS/ME patients are severely affected – they remain housebound or even bedbound for years.  There is no known cause, and no known cure.  There are no diagnostic tests, and the standard diagnostic criteria differ significantly from each other.

Because of the lack of objective evidence of abnormal biological processes in CFS/ME, many doctors support a biopsychosocial model (BPS), in which the causes of CFS/ME are said to be mostly psychological and behavioural.  These doctors recommend cognitive behaviour therapy and exercise therapies.

CFS/ME patients experience the predominant symptoms are physical, so these people have an alternative theoretical model for CFS/ME, the biomedical model (BMM), which emphasises that theirs is a purely physical disease, and not a psychological condition (despite the present lack of adequate knowledge of the pathological processes).  For these patients, psychological treatments are inappropriate, insulting, and don’t work.  Exercise therapy makes their symptoms worse.  As a CFS/ME patient Hannah Turner complains: “[There are] two treatment suggestions for ME: GET (graded exercise therapy), which is known in the ME community as "you'll get better if you stop being so lazy”, and CBT (cognitive behavioural therapy), a psychological treatment that continues to tout the belief that ME is all in our heads.”

Many CFS/ME patients dislike their doctors because they experience distress and dissatisfaction in their medical encounters, where doctors seem to say that CFS/ME patients don’t exercise enough, could well have nothing physically wrong with them, and may even be making everything up.  Similarly, some doctors dislike their militant, ‘heartsinky’ CFS/ME patients when these patients choose to reject doctors’ advice, according to a survey conducted by the professor of applied health research Rosalind Raine and her colleagues.

Are these conflicts and dislikes due mainly to the personalities and behaviours of patients and/or of doctors?   My alternative explanation is that these problems are mainly due to radical uncertainty about CFS/ME.  First of all, here is no blood test or other test that can confirm who has CFS/ME and who does not.  There is no generally-agreed definition, and no unique symptom that is shared by all CFS/ME patients and not present in other medical conditions.  The mechanisms of CFS are unknown; most treatments fail most patients.  Four decades of medical research have failed to reduce these radical uncertainties.

So, what can I suggest in order to ameliorate mutual unlikeability in CFS/ME healthcare interactions?  I argue that, in the light of uncertainty and people’s different perspectives, both the BPS and the BMM interpretations are reasonable.  However, I argue, in opposition to both sides, that the rejection of an oppositional interpretation is unreasonable.  Doctors should follow the precepts of epistemic justice and accept CFS/ME patients’ testimony about their symptoms, and accept the plausibility of patients’ ‘physical disease’ interpretation.  Similarly, CFS/ME patients need to see that, in the present absence of curative treatments, some patients may benefit from psychological and/or behavioural therapies.  So, the compromising acceptance of both models is the route to reducing epistemic friction and breakdowns in encounters between doctors and CFS/ME patients.

Further Reading

Blease, Charlotte, Havi Carel and Keith Geraghty (2017), ‘Epistemic injustice in healthcare encounters: evidence from chronic fatigue syndrome’, J Med Ethics. 2017 Aug;43(8):549-557. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2016-103691. Epub 2016 Dec 5. PMID: 27920164.

Geraghty, K., and C. Blease (2018). ‘Myalgic encephalomyelitis/chronic fatigue syndrome and the biopsychosocial model: a review of patient harm and distress in the medical encounter’. Disability and Rehabilitation 41 (25): 3092–3102.

Raine, R., S. Carter, T. Sensky, and N. Black (2004), ‘General practitioners' perceptions of chronic fatigue syndrome and beliefs about its management, compared with irritable bowel syndrome: qualitative study’. BMJ (Clinical research ed.), 328(7452): 1354–1357.

Thomas, Marie A. and Andrew P. Smith (2005), ‘Primary healthcare provision and Chronic Fatigue Syndrome: a survey of patients' and General Practitioners' beliefs’. BMC Fam Pract. 2005 Dec 13;6:49. doi: 10.1186/1471-2296-6-49. PMID: 16351714; PMCID: PMC1325235.

Turner, Hannah (2021) ‘There’s Currently No Cure for Long Covid or ME, but Only One Has Stigma Attached’, Daily Telegraph, London, 18 August 2021.

Hugh Robertson-Ritchie worked as a family doctor (general practitioner) in the National Health Service in Kent, England for many years, with a particular interest in teaching. He retired from medical practice in 2021.  In 1996, he was awarded an MPhil in the History of Medicine from Cambridge University. He obtained his MA (2020) and PhD (2026) in philosophy at the University of Kent. His philosophical interests concentrate on the application of philosophical analysis to disputes and uncertainties in medicine.  





Wednesday, 21 October 2026

“How can you stand those women??” Understanding the dislike of fibromyalgia patients as epistemic injustice and epistemic dysfunction

In today's post, Davy Tennison unpacks the role of medical dislike in the treatment of fibromyalgia patients. 

Doctor writing on paper.

Fibromyalgia (FM) is a chronic illness primarily of pain and fatigue. The illness is contested and lacks legitimacy, and FM patients lack credibility in medical spaces. A recent study in UK FM care found that doctor-patient relationships are often fraught and unproductive, with patients not believed or listened to (epistemic injustice). FM patients are also vulnerable to structural epistemic injustice that points to epistemic dysfunction in the medical system. Essentially: “No one wants to look after the fibro patient.”

I think this epistemic injustice can be understood as mediated by dislike. Specifically, a dislike-disgust-distrust feedback loop that furthers dislike of FM patients and further undermines their credibility. This feedback loop also invites moralising attitudes towards patients and punitive reactions that I call Doctor Knows Best moves.

Dislike-disgust-distrust feedback loop

Negative reactions from healthcare providers regarding FM patients include:

“They should all be shot”, “Let’s hope she doesn’t come back. I can’t stand her, she’s a fibromyalgic”

“They are patients… towards whom I feel rejection”, “Oooh how can you stand those women??”

“I always have this doubt […] It’s like you want to shake them and say: [pause] 'Snap out of it already! '” These examples display a range of feelings including dislike, disgust and distrust – but how are they connected?

FM is stereotyped as a women’s illness so I could talk about cultural and misogynistic, links between women’s bodies and disgust – but as I don’t want to play into the undue feminisation of FM, I’ll focus on viewing disgust as the emotion of social rejection. Disgust reactions change how we view and treat others. And when combined with other prejudices (such as towards social groups) it can cause us to not only dehumanize others but see them as immoral. This is where distrust comes in. People triggered with a disgust reaction have an aversion to those who violate norms, seeing them as suspicious and untrustworthy.

How are FM patients norm violators? Briefly, FM patients can’t be cured and seldom get meaningfully “better” – which denies the doctor the role of healer. The doctor also likely knows very little about FM, and in fact patients often feel forced into a “patient expert” role – upending the usual role of who have the epistemic high-ground in the relationship.

So, FM patients, as norm violators, are disliked, found disgusting, and moralised against. And that moralising takes the place of distrusting and disbelieving them (seen as epistemic injustice). There is a punitive side to disgust, as the motivation to act morally comes with the motivation to punish those who do not.

These actions are also likely viewed as moral because in our dislike-disgust-distrust framework, FM patients are conceptualised as deserving of, or inviting them. In fact, FM stereotypes echo moralizing sentiments, e.g. views of patients as lazy, malingering, drug-seekers, etc. Similarly doctors label FM patients in ways that position them as morally wrong: noncompliant, difficult, heartsink.

I label these reactions, along with other instances of epistemic injustice faced by FM patients as Doctor Knows Best moves – and conceptualise them specifically as tactics of epistemic oppression.

Doctor Knows Best moves

In “Down Girl, Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny” (2017), Kate Manne conceptualises misogyny as the policing arm of the patriarchy, and describes misogynistic “Down Girl” moves that serve a punitive, moralising function – shaming women for perceived moral errors. Within a misogynistic environment Down Girl moves punish not just the violation of gendered norms, but any well-entrenched social norm.

A Doctor Knows Best move is a hostile or dismissive reaction from a doctor to an FM patient. It’s epistemic injustice, yes, but its more than that. It’s a kneejerk reaction to protect the epistemic institution of medicine, bolster the doctor’s position, and put the patient back in their place - which suggests an underlying, more systemic epistemic dysfunction in medicine.

This plays out in the FM doctor-patients relationship in ways such as:

Patients commonly reporting doctors sighing, looking annoyed with them, rolling their eyes etc.

Doctors try to avoid FM patients and report referring them away for this reason

On a more structural level, negative stereotypes and judgements of FM patients are passed down in e.g. medical schools (via the “hidden curriculum”.

This is a manifestation of an unjust and broken doctor-patient relationship, and an epistemic dysfunction in the institution of medicine.

It is an issue of epistemic injustice, yes, but it manifests as poor treatment of patients, making it a crucial issue of social injustice for FM patients today. 

Further reading:

Kelly, D. R. (2011). Yuck! : the nature and moral significance of disgust / Daniel Kelly. MIT Press.

Kidd, I. J., & Carel, H. (2017). Epistemic Injustice and Illness. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 34(2), 172–190. https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12172 

Manne, K. (2017). Down girl : the logic of misogyny / Kate Manne. Oxford University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190604981.001.0001

PACFiND Study: https://www.abdn.ac.uk/iahs/academic/epidemiology/our-research/studies-list/pacfind/

Davy Tennison is a PhD student in UCL's Science & Technology Studies Department. Their work focuses on chronic contested illnesses, epistemic injustice in healthcare and the doctor-patient relationship.





Wednesday, 14 October 2026

Likeability, Silence, and Power: Affective and Epistemic Injustice in Perinatal Care

In this post, Cristina Ganz discusses her work with midwives on the epistemic dimensions of reproductive violence.

Activist with placard reading 'let's talk about the elephant in the womb.'.

Over the past three years, Mara Floris, Noemi Paciscopi and I have run a series of focus groups with Italian midwives. What we wanted was simple: to hear, in their own words, how they experience a phenomenon that happens all over the world and that we now tend to call “obstetric violence”.

One midwife told us about Maria (not her real name, of course), a pregnant woman who spent a long time in hospital, reporting severe pain:

I hadn’t been working there for very long, just a few months, but the colleagues’ experience had been like: “They call a lot, they ring for everything!”. She was a woman who, even for a short movement – like coming in to get a fetal monitoring – needed a wheelchair. She was otherwise healthy, and it wasn’t really clear what was wrong with her. Basically, all of us thought it was too much, that there was some kind of discomfort that went beyond physical well-being at that stage of pregnancy.

It turned out Maria had pneumonia: her pain was real, her requests had been entirely reasonable all along. This story is, in many ways, a textbook case of epistemic injustice – and more specifically, testimonial injustice. Maria’s testimony rested on what Lauren Freeman calls epistemic privilege: the direct, first-hand access we all have to our own bodily sensations. Nobody else can feel our pain the way we do. And yet healthcare professionals gave more weight to the medical tests: everything looked fine on paper, and the pain she reported was written off as psychosomatic.

Why does this happen? Cohen Shabot points to a double prejudice. Women are often seen as irrational and overly emotional, a bias historically tied to their reproductive bodies – think of the old diagnosis of “hysteria”, where the uterus was invoked and blamed for pathologising expressions of femininity deemed unconventional. During pregnancy, that reproductive body becomes even more central, and pregnant women end up seen as even more irrational, vulnerable, out of control – incapable, basically, of making sound decisions about themselves.

Rosalind Ekman Ladd made this point back in 1989, using the example of informed consent during labour: women sign it beforehand, but once labour actually starts, they’re rarely allowed to change their mind – as if pain and fear had made them unfit to decide for themselves anymore. Yet we don’t apply that logic anywhere else: a patient with severe burns, in agony, terrified, can still refuse treatment on the spot. So, as Ladd puts it, the issue was never really pain and fear making people incapable of deciding. The issue is whose pain and fear we’re willing to trust.

Miranda Fricker explains this kind of injustice as based on negative identity-based prejudice: it leads listeners to underestimate – or, as José Medina adds, sometimes overestimate – a speaker’s competence and sincerity. What we want to suggest here is a small but meaningful adjustment to that picture. We think identity-based prejudice doesn’t only chip away at how sincere someone seems – it affects, more broadly, how warm they seem. This comes from a different field entirely: social psychology, and specifically the Stereotype Content Model (SCM).

The SCM, developed by Fiske and colleagues, explains how stereotypes shape the way we see other people and groups. Whenever we size someone up, we’re implicitly asking two questions: do they mean to help or harm me, and are they capable of following through? These map onto two dimensions of social judgment: warmth and competence. Warmth covers sincerity, friendliness, benevolence: whether someone’s intentions are good or bad. Competence covers intelligence, skill, capability: whether they can actually act on those intentions.

Put the two together, and you get a fairly reliable map of how we stereotype different groups, and how we feel about them as a result. People we see as both warm and competent tend to earn our admiration and respect. People we see as neither tend to get contempt and hostility. Competent but cold groups often provoke envy, and warm but incompetent groups tend to be met with pity, sympathy, and a kind of paternalism.

This is where the SCM adds something useful to Fricker’s picture. Sincerity is only one piece of something broader: warmth. We’re generally more inclined to trust people who come across as warm in this fuller sense, and more suspicious of those who don’t. And once you look at warmth as a whole, you notice there’s more going on in Maria’s case than sincerity alone can capture. Not only was her pain considered untrustworthy, unlike the medical tests, and her competence cast into doubt, her symptoms dismissed as psychological rather than physical (“She was otherwise healthy… all of us thought it was too much, that there was some kind of discomfort that went beyond physical well-being at that stage of pregnancy”) – she was also seen as demanding, whiny, difficult to deal with (“They call a lot, they ring for everything!”). In SCM terms: low warmth, low competence.

Widening Fricker’s account from sincerity to warmth gives us a sharper lens for spotting exactly where and how credibility breaks down. And that, ultimately, is why this framework matters beyond Maria’s case. Looking at obstetric violence through the combined lens of epistemic injustice and the Stereotype Content Model doesn’t just help us understand what happened to her: it gives us a sharper tool for understanding what happens, more broadly, whenever patients walk into a hospital room and aren’t quite believed.

Suggested readings

Chadwick R (2020) Practices of silencing. Birth, marginality and epistemic violence, in Childbirth, Vulnerability and Law: Exploring Issues of Violence and Control, a c. di Camilla Pickles and Jonathan Herring, London and New York: Routledge.

Cohen Shabot S. (2021) “You are Not Qualified—Leave it to us”: Obstetric Violence as Testimonial Injustice. Human Studies 44: 635–653.

Ekman Ladd R. (1989) Women in Labor: some Issues about Informed Consent. Hypatia 4(3): 37-45.

Fiske ST, Cuddy AJC, Glick P & Xu J. (2002) A model of (often mixed) stereotype content: Competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and competition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82(6): 878–902. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.82.6.878.

Freeman L (2015) Confronting diminished epistemic privilege and epistemic injustice in pregnancy by challenging a “panoptics of the womb”, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 40(1): 44–68.

Cristina Ganz holds a Bachelor’s and Master’s degree in Philosophy. She is currently a PhD candidate in Philosophy of Language and Epistemology at Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele (Milan), with a research project titled “Public Policies and Institutional Strategies for Identifying and Countering Misogyny: The Role of Communication in Obstetric-Gynaecological Care”. The project aims to improve communication between pregnant, birthing, and postpartum individuals and healthcare staff, with particular attention to epistemic, discursive, and affective injustice.





Wednesday, 7 October 2026

Navigating dislike in healthcare: October takeover

In today's post, EPIC's Fred Cooper introduces a series of blogs on like and dislike in health care, and their epistemic consequences.

Image credit: Wellcome Collection

In his famous meditation on general practice in the 1960s, A Fortunate Man, John Berger asked how his subject, Dr John Sassall, can have his measure taken. ‘We find ourselves without a scale of standards for judging or assessing one another’, Berger argues; ‘the only standard which remains is that of personal liking – or its commercial variant, which is Personality.’ Berger liked Sassall – a pseudonym for his own GP, John Eskell – immensely, but he recognised something impoverished and flat in the tyranny of that metric.

Berger’s subject, Eskell, was the kind of GP who thought deeply about his relationship with his patients, and understood the complexities of his role as witness and consoler, meeting the ‘patient’s deep, unformulated expectation of fraternity’ in illness and injury. His apartness, Berger observed, barred him from the benefits of that cultivated – but no less authentic – fraternity, while allowing him to confer them on all of his patients, regardless of his personal impression of them.  

Contrary to Berger’s romanticised view of Eskell, and of general practice more broadly, his contemporaries seemed to have more trouble. In their 1976 study, Doctors talking to Patients, Patrick Byrne and Barrie Long conducted a close linguistic analysis of dozens of tape-recorded medical consultations, paying particular attention to how doctors’ individual questioning styles opened up or shut down lines of enquiry vital to correct diagnosis. While different doctors frequently had entrenched and observable styles, whether paternalist and taciturn, open and curious, or somewhere in between, the researchers also found a significant degree of variation by practitioner. Some interactions were easy, marked by mutual respect; others more abrupt, resigned, frustrated, and these were far less likely to allow the patient to really speak.

Inscrutable in these interviews, there is distinct politics to who gets to be liked by who, or who can and can’t access the kinds of easy geniality increasingly expected to smooth interactions along; what Teow Lim Goh describes as ‘the dehumanising politics of likability’. One curt greeting in Byrne and Long’s study, ‘you again’, gives us one clue to a set of relations probably more likely to fray than most: those between the doctor and the ‘repeat attender’, the frequent patient with no clear physical cause for their troubles. T.F. Main’s 1957 essay, The Ailment, argued that protracted, mysterious, and refractory complaints introduced novel psychodynamic problems into medical care: in his words, ‘the patient’s attendants are pleased neither with him nor themselves and the quality of their concern for him alters accordingly.’ Main discerned a pattern, again in his words, of ‘old unsettled interpersonal scores hitherto unrecognized’, including ‘guilts, angers, envies, resentments, unspoken blamings, alliances and revenges’, ‘shown now to have both animated some of the nursing procedures offered these patients, and to have been concealed behind them.’

We can see some of these concerns surfacing again in the early 1990s, in Darryl Watts and Gethin Morgan’s formulation of the concept of ‘malignant alienation’. Detailing a rapid epistemic and relational breakdown between doctor and patient, which the authors recognised as a common factor in a number of potentially preventable suicides, the article carried the subheading ‘dangers for patients who are hard to like.’ This marked a subtle – but vital – shift in emphasis on who, precisely, is bringing their baggage into the consultation room.

The next three entries in the EPIC blog unpick questions of dislike – and their epistemic consequences – across three significant pressure points in healthcare. Cristina Ganz, in her work on midwives and obstetric violence; Davy Tennison, in their research on the medical dislike of fibromyalgia patients as epistemic injustice and epistemic dysfunction; and Hugh Robertson-Ritchie, in his reflection on ME/CFS and the frictions generated by incompatible aetiological interpretations. The essays address an area of experience which has so far been black-boxed by epistemic injustice researchers, being supposedly too unknowable or idiosyncratic to make any kind of systematic sense from. Attending critically to like and dislike can take us further than simple bad luck, revealing significant – and unjust – disparities in experiences or outcomes that might otherwise elude analysis.

John Berger and Jean Mohr. 1967. A fortunate man. The story of a country doctor. London: Allen Lane.  

P. Byrne and B. Long. 1976. Doctors Talking to Patients. London: HMSO.

Teow Lim Goh. 2019. The Dehumanizing Politics of Likability. Los Angeles Review of Books. August 21. https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/dehumanizing-politics-likability/.

T. F. Main. 1957. The Ailment. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 30: 129-145. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8341.1957.tb01193.x

D. Watts and G. Morgan. 1994. Malignant alienation. Dangers for patients who are hard to like. The British journal of psychiatry: the journal of mental science, 164(1): 11–15. https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.164.1.11. 

Fred Cooper is a historian of medicine, and a senior research associate at EPIC. He leads an EPIC case study on loneliness and epistemic injustice. 

Wednesday, 30 September 2026

Amplifying the voices of young care leavers

This post by Lucy Jamieson and Wiedaad Slemming considers how an international co-production project helped to empower a group of young care leavers epistemically and politically.



The voices of young care leavers are routinely discounted, ignored or excluded from conversations that directly affect their lives. Their knowledge, insights and expertise about navigating complex systems are rarely centred in policy, practice or research.  Led by Prof Mandi MacDonald (Queen’s University Belfast) and Lucy Jamieson (Children’s Institute, University of Cape Town), the Amplifying the Voices of Young Care Leavers project built an international learning community between care-experienced youth, researchers and practitioners in Northern Ireland (VOYPIC) and South Africa (Mamelani Projects). 

Through online discussions, international exchanges in Cape Town and Belfast, and participatory filmmaking, young people shared their experiences, identified priorities for leaving care research and developed advocacy messages alongside researchers and service providers to change policy and practice.

Despite living more than 10,000 kilometres apart, participants found striking similarities in their experiences. Conversations repeatedly returned to the importance of relationships, belonging, identity and being listened to. Young people spoke about the challenges of securing stable housing, employment opportunities, financial support and mental health struggles before and after leaving care. They also highlighted a less visible need: the desire to feel seen, heard and supported over time rather than only during moments of crisis.

What made this project particularly significant was its commitment to recognising young people as knowledge producers. Participatory filmmaking enabled care leavers to tell their own stories rather than having them interpreted by others. The resulting documentary, United & Unique: Separated by Geography, Connected by Community, foregrounds perspectives that are often marginalised and challenges stereotypical narratives about young people with care experience.

From an epistemic justice perspective, one of the most powerful messages to emerge was that young people are experts on their own lives. The project demonstrated that when care-experienced youth are given meaningful opportunities to participate, they generate valuable insights into what works, what does not, and what change is needed. As participants reflected, leaving care is not a single event but an ongoing process requiring sustained support and strong relationships.

The project's impact continues beyond the documentary. In South Africa, the findings are supporting advocacy for stronger policy commitments and funding for aftercare services beyond the age of 18. In Northern Ireland, the project is helping to highlight gaps between policy commitments and implementation. More broadly, it has created a platform where care-experienced young people can influence public understanding and policy conversations.

For those of us concerned with epistemic injustice, the lesson is clear: meaningful change begins when young people are not only invited to speak but are recognised as credible knowers whose lived experience is vital to shaping the systems that affect them.

The young people have produced a report to accompany the film, which you can download: McCallin_et_al_25_United_Unique_youth_report.pdf

Watch the film:

About the authors

Lucy Jamieson and Prof Wiedaad Slemming, from the Children’s Institute, University of Cape Town visited the University of Bristol to foster a partnership with the Centre for Childhoods and Social Justice.  When planning international research with children, considerations of decolonisation and epistemic justice assume particular significance. 

Epistemic justice asks who is doing the research, with whom, about what, through what means, to what ends, in whose interests and requires reflection on power imbalances to ensure genuine and equitable partnership across cultures and generations.  

International partnerships between the Global North and the Global South are especially challenging due to inequities in resources to produce knowledge, recognition of expertise, and the platforms to have that knowledge heard. Lucy presented on participatory methods used in two international research projects including the co-production of the documentary United and Unique.

Friday, 25 September 2026

A Young Person's Reflections on Exploring Epistemic Injustice Creatively

In this post Anaya, a member of the Bristol Young People's Advisory Group, reflects on her participation in a creative workshop that took place in July 2026. The workshop explored how young people and children are, or aren't, heard and taken seriously.

'Hope' by Anaya. Her description of the work: 'My artwork's name is Hope. This links to epistemic justice because it shows a child struggling to voice their thoughts because they are silenced in a contrast of a black and white world. The yellow light displayed in their mind is hope because it demonstrates that children have colourful thoughts in comparison to our black and white world so if we listen to kids then it will benefit us. The yellow throughout the art mimics light appearing in the darkness which is symbolic of the hope a child's voice can give'.

I have always been aware that whenever children tend to share information with adults, they get ignored because adults believe they are wiser and more knowledgeable. They disregard kids’ views because of a prejudiced belief that every child is immature and unaware, so nothing they say must ever be taken into account. However, I was not aware that this is known as Epistemic Injustice, so this session educated me.

It was an eye opener to discover more reasons as to why adults do this, like they don't want to take accountability for their actions or they genuinely believe they are superior just because of their age. I believe this is very backwards thinking that needs to be improved, as everyone deserves to feel heard and seen. This session did exactly that, as it accepted my views and made me feel valued.

It allowed me to communicate my message through art and it was truly fascinating to see what powerful messages artworks can deliver. I chose to do an art piece about the contrast of light and dark. This mirrors a child's thoughts because they believe the whole world is dark and inconsiderate as it doesn't listen to them. The child's mind, however, is light because it possesses many great ideas just like adults do. My message is the hope that a child's light will be brought into the world of research, therefore making it better and more inclusive to multiple perspectives and lives.

I enjoyed participating in this workshop because it included other young people and addressed the message directly to us to help us become aware of the epistemic injustice surrounding us. In doing that, it made us all feel very comfortable and empowered. After we each completed our own artwork, we went around in a circle and explained the choices we made and why we did them. I loved doing this because it provided a deeper insight for both the researchers and kids involved about perspectives. The diversity in the artwork helped me understand how my peers see the world and how important it is that those views get heard.

Research tends to focus on adults, so it doesn't always work for kids. Workshops like this help research to move forward and progress because they allow it to become more inclusive to everyone. Listening to kids improves many projects that people are completing, especially if they link to young people. This workshop was truly an amazing experience that allowed me to express my opinions in exceptional ways, so I hope that the people involved know they've truly made a difference!


The workshop Anaya took part in is informing a upcoming EPIC Event: Doing Justice to Children’s Voices Tickets, Tuesday, November 3 • 6:30 PM–8:30 PM |Eventbrite. The event is free and all are welcome! Please register via the link above if you want to join us.


Wednesday, 23 September 2026

Workshop Report: Trust and the Affective Dimensions of Health and Healthcare

 In this post, Sofia Martellini reports back from a workshop on Trust and Affective Justice at the University of Bristol.

Woman helping man with shirt.
Source: Wellcome Collection

On June 9th, Project EPIC and the Centre for Health, Humanities and Science co-sponsored an afternoon of guest lectures and group discussions, on the theme of Trust and the Affective Dimensions of Health and Healthcare.

While my talk highlighted one aspect of epistemic injustice in healthcare, the wide range of expertise exhibited by the other speakers brought diverse and interesting perspectives on the meaning of Trust and Affectivity.

Professor Havi Carel opened with a provocation: we walk through the world with a deep, unspoken faith in our bodies. We quietly, blindly believe that we're going to be ok and we are capable of doing what we want with our bodies. Illness has the capacity to shatter this tacit certainty, even more so in critical or end-of-life conditions, where our body becomes uncapable of the most basics of actions. She distinguished bodily doubt in everyday illness  from radical bodily doubt; the kind that sets in at the extremes of experience. Here, continuity collapses entirely, the body becomes entirely medicalized, subjectivity dropping away as the body is treated as an object from those around it. Her discussion of ICU experiences, also sourcing from her own personal experience, where passivity is total and people simply have things done to them, was particularly striking.

Dr Ross Pain then turned our attention to Indigenous healthcare in Australia, where outcomes between white and indigenous people remain deeply inequitable. Different contexts have different ways of understanding and processing pain, and Dr Pain highlighted philosophy’s tendency of overgeneralizing in order to arrive to a theoretical explanation. When philosophical concepts like epistemic injustice travel across different cultural contexts, do they actually fit? His notion of the "fittingness condition" asks us to reckon honestly with the limits of our conceptual tools.

Drawing on my time in the LeTs-Care research project, I argued that informal caregivers are victims of hermeneutical injustice, since they lack the shared concepts to make sense of, and communicate, their own experience. In Mediterranean contexts especially, there is often no culturally resonant word for "caregiver" at all; caring is only a part of family duty, invisible and unnamed. My proposed PhD aims to address this through phenomenological interviews and a broader look at how care appears across different cultures, asking whether these radically different ways of understanding care are given any epistemic recognition in the policies that are supposed to help caregivers today.

Doctoral fellow Anna Pathmanathan then brought the discussion to the clinic and the prescription pad, presenting research on antibiotic prescribing disparities across minoritized ethnic populations in primary care. Combining large-scale data with patient and prescriber interviews, her work surfaces how systemic inequity can hide in plain sight, encoded in everyday clinical decisions. The doctor-patient trust relationship varies across social status, culture and other variables, filled with prejudices and epistemic inequalities: understanding how this complex dynamic works can bring light to the issue of overmedicalization, still much present in the UK.

Finally, Cristina Ganz examined communication-based epistemic injustices in doctor-patient relations, mapping how discursive, epistemic, and affective injustices layer on top of each other in clinical interactions. Her clear framework showed how different ways of addressing patients corresponded to different kinds of epistemic injustice and separating them allows us to understand how to better direct the dialogue between doctor and patient.

The variety and depth of  different interventions showed how an apparently simple concept like trust can be conjugated in meaningful but diverse ways, tied to the notion of epistemic injustice. From the creation of a theoretical concept such as radical bodily doubt, to empirical research projects meant to show trust relationships and the issues of philosophy when applied to real cases of trust loss, epistemic injustice and trust intertwine throughout different disciplines and cases. This event made me realize even more intensely how fundamental interdisciplinarity is for better research and progress, especially in fields where theory and practice come into contact. 

Without culturally specific, in-depth empirical research, philosophers can risk falling into overgeneralization, as Dr Ross Pain showed; on the other hand, through philosophically developed concepts such as epistemic injustice, negative clinical experiences can be better understood. By sharing our experiences and projects, our collective understanding of epistemic injustice, trust and affective dimensions can grow throughout different disciplines, bringing progress and new solutions to epistemic injustice issues all over the world.

Sofia Martellini is a Philosophy PhD candidate at the University of Bristol, supervised by Professor Havi Carel and Wilhelm Dagmar. Her research sits at the intersection of epistemic injustice, phenomenology and ethics of care, with a particular focus on informal caregiving and the hermeneutical gaps that leave carers without adequate concepts to make sense of their own experience. She holds degrees in Philosophy from KU Leuven and Applied Ethics from Utrecht University and has been involved in the LeTs-Care European research project. She spoke at the CHHS & EPIC workshop in June 2026.



Wednesday, 16 September 2026

Contagion’s complexities: When persuasive theory takes priority

 In today’s post, Veronica Heney considers how skewed hermeneutical resources – in intimations of contagion around valid discussions of self-harm – can frame multiple layers of epistemic injustice.

Self-harm’s relation to culture – to society, to sociality, to cultural texts, to the arts – is most frequently framed through the theory (and ensuing fear) of contagion. From policy to public discourse and academic research, there is a recurrent fear both that seeing self-harm will lead to people beginning to self-harm, and that individuals discussing self-harm with their peers (primarily in healthcare or educational settings) will lead people to begin self-harming.

My assessment of the psychological theories and evidence behind social contagion as a broad theory is that it is not nearly as thorough or well-grounded as the theory’s popularity might lead us to believe. A much-referenced contemporary epidemiological study examined a large dataset and drew conclusions about the relative contagiousness of a wide range of phenomenon from smoking to obesity to depression to divorce to sexuality to tastes in music. This collection of research is repeatedly used to prove that social contagion exists – yet (as acknowledged by the researchers) it only evidences correlation not causation, and fails to account for any number of confounding factors.

Specific evidence on self-harm is similarly patchy. Sarah Chaney has pointed out that initial contagion research focused on the spread of self-harm in hospital wards, and often drew on small samples or used a flawed study design. Nevertheless, publications either drew unduly strong conclusions, or were cited in ways that ignored their limitations and extended their conclusions far beyond institutional healthcare settings.

Despite the flawed evidence base, literature review papers are often published stating definitively that self-harm is contagious. Even more concerningly, this supposedly well-established fact has expanded beyond the interpersonal to incorporate the realm of media and the internet, where conclusions are drawn based on general concepts in social psychology (such as script theory and disinhibition theory) and empirical research on suicide, without any acknowledgment that the state of play with regards to self-harm might be very different indeed.

First, all this epistemically weak evidence is taken very seriously, in part because it is quantitative, and therefore taken to be objective, firm fact. Almost none of this evidence involves in-depth qualitative research with people who self-harm specifically exploring experiences of contagion. As a result, the evidence about self-harm and contagion is knowledge in which people who self-harm function as an object of knowledge, but are never permitted to author knowledge. 

This is, precisely, an example of epistemic injustice. What we know – or worse, what it is taken for granted that we know, but in fact might not be true at all – is knowledge that denies and silences the insight, experience, and expertise of people who self-harm. It is striking how easy it is to disregard people who self-harm, to trust psychology, neuroscience, and other medicalised frameworks and not to question what these approaches miss.

Second, it is important to notice that while this is an epistemic failing, it is one which has very tangible consequences. An interesting pre-cursor to the now widely-discussed social-media ban for young people was the Online Safety Act, which came into effect in 2023. The act introduced an offence which prohibited the deliberate encouragement of self-harm. While the offence itself seemed to prohibit bullying or coercion, it was framed by MPs and by campaigners as a response to recommendations from the Law Commission on the ‘glorification’ of self-harm online, and to recent inquest reports from the deaths of young people who engaged with self-harm content online and later died by suicide. 

I was involved in a campaign led by my friend and colleague Courtney Buckler to encourage lawmakers to specify that the offence would apply only to ‘malicious’ content (which we agree should be prohibited). We felt cruel bullying should be distinguished from other content which might be deemed encouragement – for instance posts in which people shared positive feelings around their own self-harm, or harm minimisation resources designed to help people self-harm safely, and reduce the risk of unintentional serious injury.

The Conservative Party politicians who had proposed the law did not take our advice and we have yet to see what the consequences of this unnecessarily broad law might be. But I worry about how fears of contagion, fears of anything that frames self-harm positively, might be used against people who self-harm to limit what we can say, what we can share, and what we can know. I am frustrated that these fears are built up from so shaky an evidence base, and I am certain that to truly understand how people who self-harm may or may not be influenced by the world around them – by their friends, by social media posts, by TV shows or by anything else – we need to start by talking to them, listening to them, and placing them at the centre of the knowledge we create about self-harm. 

My new project, Re-Knowing Self-Harm, tries to do just that, drawing on a range of different creative methods to rethink the relationship between self-harm and culture. I’ll be running a lived experience reading group around social contagion, and together we’ll decide how we might do research that begins with people who self-harm, rather than leaving them on the periphery of knowledge-making about their own lives.

Further Readings

Chaney, S., 2017. Psyche on the Skin: A History of Self-harm. Reaktion Books.

Christakis, N.A. and Fowler, J.H., 2013. Social contagion theory: examining dynamic social networks and human behavior. Statistics in medicine, 32(4), pp.556-577.

Jarvi, S., Jackson, B., Swenson, L. and Crawford, H., 2013. The impact of social contagion on non-suicidal self-injury: A review of the literature. Archives of suicide research, 17(1), pp.1-19.

Whitlock, J., Purington, A. and Gershkovich, M., 2009. Media, the internet, and nonsuicidal self-injury.

Open letter on self-harm and the Online Safety Bill: A call for caution, nuance, and care - NSUN website

Veronica Heney is Assistant Professor for Medical Humanities at Durham University, and co-lead of the Narrative Practices Lab at Durham Research Platform for Medical Humanities. Her work brings together social science and literary studies methods to explore narratives and experiences of madness and mental distress. She is co-founder and Research Lead of Make Space, a user-led collective which facilitates conversations about more generous, nuanced, and caring ways to support those with experience of self-harm.

Veronica Heney