Whose knowledge counts? Learning from epistemic injustice in global health

This post, by Michael Bresalier, reports and reflects on a recent, interdisciplinary workshop about epistemic injustice in global health.

Global health aspires to reduce inequality—but its structures can also reproduce the very inequities it seeks to solve. This paradox sat at the heart of a recent EPIC roundtable on Learning from epistemic injustice in global health. Organised and convened by Michael Bresalier, the roundtable brought together a health systems researcher, a legal scholar, a consultant physician in HIV/Sexual Health, a doctoral researcher in mental health, and a philosopher to tackle this paradox. Seye Abimbola, Himani Bhakuni, Rageshri Dhairyawan, Ian James Kidd and Linda Maqutu shared their insights on how knowledge and power shape global health, how these forces determine whose voices are heard and ignored, and ways to address epistemic injustice in healthcare systems.

Defining key terms:  ‘epistemic injustice’ and ‘global health’

To start, panellists were asked to define the two key terms under discussion. They broadly agreed that epistemic injustice involves harms done to people in their capacity as knowers. Kidd explained that people have fundamental “epistemic needs” – to understand, interpret and share knowledge – and injustice occurs when these needs are blocked by prejudice, bias, or structural exclusion. Bhakuni extended this to global health, describing systematic forms of epistemic harm that affect entire populations, particularly through credibility deficits (where local expertise is dismissed) and interpretive marginalisation (where communities lack the resources to define their own experiences). Dhairyawan characterised epistemic injustice as one of the ways in which healthcare can dehumanise individuals and groups. There was broad agreement that these injustices are not incidental but deeply embedded in healthcare systems.

Defining global health proved more difficult. Rather than settling on a single definition, panellists agreed that global health is a set of relationships structured by inequality. Abimbola offered a resonant framing of global health as a “meeting of unequals,” a relationship structured by disparities in power, resources, and authority—especially epistemic power—that shape how health problems are defined and addressed across the globe. This imbalance determines everything from which problems are prioritised to how research is conducted—and whose knowledge is seen as legitimate.

Others reinforced this relational view. Bhakuni stressed that the “global doesn’t exist without the local,” pointing out that similar power asymmetries recur at multiple scales – from international partnerships to doctor-patient interactions. Maqutu similarly pointed to “unequal epistemic authority” not only between the Global North and South but also within healthcare systems. Taken together, global health emerged as both an aspirational project of reducing health inequities and a field structured by persistent asymmetries in what knowledge is produced, valued and applied.

Colonialism and epistemic injustice

A particularly nuanced discussion focused on the relationship between colonialism and epistemic injustice. Panellists agreed that colonial histories are deeply entangled with global health but resisted reducing all epistemic injustice to colonialism alone. Abimbola described the relationship as a “Venn diagram”: overlapping but not identical. Colonialism is one important driver of epistemic injustice, he suggested, but epistemic harms can also arise from other forms of exclusion and hierarchy. At the same time, colonial legacies continue to shape whose knowledge is recognised in global health. Maqutu illustrated this through the marginalisation of Indigenous knowledge systems, such as African traditional medicine, which are often excluded in mental health provision even when they are central to patients’ health beliefs and lives.

The roundtable stressed that while global health remains historically entangled with colonising forms of power, not all epistemic injustice in global health is colonial in origin. Overextending this connection risks collapsing complex problems into a single historical frame. Instead, analyses of unjust knowledge systems in global health require multifactorial perspectives.

These complex dynamics become especially visible in practice. In a discussion of the challenges in justifying funding for a small study of intimate partner violence among HIV-positive women, Dhairyawan described how both patients and healthcare workers can experience dismissal or silencing, sometimes leading to “testimonial smothering.” Abimbola highlighted how global metrics or standards—often set by organisations like the WHO—can distort local realities when imposed without context, forcing countries to “understand themselves” through external frameworks while ignoring local health realities. Across these cases, epistemic injustice appears as a structural feature of how knowledge is produced, validated, and applied.

From inclusion to transformation

When it came to solutions, panellists agreed that responses to epistemic injustice must be context-sensitive, dialogical, and attentive to power. But individual-level changes—such as encouraging clinicians or researchers to listen more—are not enough. While individual virtues such as empathy are important, they are insufficient on their own. Structural change is essential.

Bhakuni proposed reframing epistemic harms as violations of dignity and rights, requiring institutional accountability. Maqutu argued for epistemic decolonisation: not just including marginalised voices but transforming the standards by which knowledge is judged. Abimbola cautioned that even well-meaning efforts at inclusion can fail if underlying power structures remain unchanged.

Kidd added an important caveat for those using the epistemic injustice as a universal framework. Dominant understandings of epistemic injustice often reflect moral and political frameworks rooted in Global North traditions. Scholars in the Global South have challenged this apparent universality, emphasising the need for broader, more context-sensitive interpretations. In this view, epistemic injustice should be understood not as a single fixed concept, but as a wide class of epistemic wrongs—arising from prejudice, bias, and exclusion—shaped by long, complex historical and social processes, including but not limited to colonialism.

The roundtable closed with a powerful insight. Epistemic and material harms are deeply intertwined in healthcare. Ignoring people’s knowledge not only marginalises them—it can also undermine trust, worsen health outcomes, and deepen inequalities.

While global is committed to justice and equality, it often operates through unequal knowledge systems. If it is to live up to its promise of equity, global health must come to terms with this paradox. This means grappling not only with disparities in resources, but with inequalities in knowledge itself—asking, at every level, not just what works, but whose knowledge counts.

Further reading

Seye Abimbola (2024), The Foreign Gaze: Essays on Global Health (open access), Marseille: IRD Editions.

Himani Bhakuni and Seye Abimbola (2021), “Epistemic injustice in academic global health,” The Lancet: Global Health.

Himani Bhakuni (2023), “Epistemic repair in global health: a human rights approach towards epistemic justice,” BMJ Global Health.

Rageshri Dhairyawan (2024), Unheard: The Medical Practice of Silencing, Trapeze: London.

Linda Maqutu (2025), “Challenging Philosophical Instincts and Embracing Complexity: A Commentary on Elizabeth Barnes’s Health Problems,” Philosophical Psychology.

Author bio

Michael Bresalier is Senior Lecturer in the History of Medicine at Swansea University and Special Investigator on EPIC, for which he leads a case study on the history of ’selective’ tuberculosis vaccination in Britain, 1965-2005.