The mental aspects of urban justice

Life in cities is often a matter of extremes. It can be both stimulating and stressful. It can be socially enriching and isolating. It can involve encounters with political openness and with xenophobia. The kind of experiences one has in a city is not a mere matter of luck. Structural injustices and concrete policy decisions shape the lives of urban dwellers—not only what they do, but also what they feel, believe and desire. This is the guiding question of the research project I began last year at the University of Antwerp, titled Affect In the City (AFFINITY): The emotional dimensions of urban justice (2025-2028).

Cities are a main topic of investigation in the social sciences and the humanities, as well as some philosophical traditions—cities are in central works of Plato, Al-Farabi, Walter Benjamin, or Henri Lefevbre. The last few years have seen a booming number of philosophical works on cities from a broadly analytic approach (including books on spatial agency, urban equality and housing justice), as well as the creation of academic venues partly or wholly dedicated to urban space. I am myself a member-at-large of the Philosophy of the City Research Group, and there are other projects with a broader focus on philosophy of space at Stirling and Eichstätt. In the areas of moral and political philosophy, we can talk of the emergence of local normative theory, which has the local as the main target and scope and looks not only at cities, but also at rural space.

Project AFFINITY aims to highlight the role of mental life in local normative theory, by drawing from insights into affective and epistemic injustice, cognitive scaffolding, and theories of self-narration. The working assumption is that social conventions and policy applications have a great impact on people’s mental lives within urban settings, by shaping how they feel, how they act, and how they think about themselves and their surroundings.

As Joel Krueger argues, elements of the environment scaffold urban dwellers’ cognitive-affective processes, for example, whether people feel like they belong in the city or whether they believe they are welcome in certain spaces. Krueger focuses on the extreme kind of marginalization that occurs in homelessness. But the influence of elements of urban space on people’s minds can also be assessed more broadly.

Think of something as apparently trivial as traffic lights. In England, pedestrians have 6 seconds to cross during a green light. This is way too fast for disabled and elderly people. Or think about the names of your city’s streets. Do they commemorate people like you? Or do they perpetuate the belief that you need to be a certain kind of person for your city to be proud of you, or that only certain stories count? These elements of urban life do not merely create short-lived, isolated experiences of stress, discomfort, or alienation. Over time, they accumulate into significant harms to subjective well-being (including positive emotions and mental health) and block access to hermeneutical resources that are crucial to self-understanding.

The project will examine three dimensions of city life (belonging, environment, and narrative) to understand how policy decisions shape mental processes, and whether these effects align with the principles of urban justice. The first publication looks into the demands on policy-makers to ensure that disadvantaged people are not unfairly burdened at an emotional level by gentrification and migration. I am currently researching the affective harms of oversized cars, the legitimacy of anger against tourists, the connection between loneliness and the 15-minute city, and the influence of public urban commemoration in self-narration, as well as planning many exciting collaborations. In this way, project AFFINITY  aims to place the mental dimensions of urban justice at the centre of local normative theory. By doing so, it will help clarify what is needed for a good life in the city that is accessible to all, and guide the design of policies capable of addressing non-material urban problems—such as loneliness, lack of safety and disenfranchisement—which compound and reinforce social and economic inequalities.

Bio: Pilar Lopez-Cantero is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie/YUFE4Postdocs Fellow at the University of Antwerp, and is currently the Principal Investigator of project AFFINITY (grant No 101081327). She works on practical philosophy, ethics and political philosophy — particularly questions about personal relationships, self-narration, travel, and the city.

 

 

Abolitionist perspectives on epistemic injustice in psychiatry

This post by Cath Roper and Nina Joffee-John explores abolitionist perspectives on how to address epistemic injustices in mental healthcare, drawing on interviews with mental health service users/survivors.

Unlike physical health, which protects the principle of informed consent to treatment, specific legislation enables public mental health services to authorise detention, administer treatment to persons without consent, and use restrictive practices. In most jurisdictions, such legislation operates across inpatient and community settings, invoking human rights issues.

People who have been labelled as ‘mentally ill’ belong to a group whose testimony can be doubted on grounds that it is faulty, unreliable, untrustworthy. We are often seen to lack ‘competence’ and ‘insight’ and our knowledge is not given credence. We can even be placed under the aegis of mental health legislation on these grounds.

Most of the researchers in our study had a lived experience of public mental health services.  Because of this, our perspectives could be regarded as inherently untrustworthy and we could experience  ‘testimonial injustice’.  The epistemic power of law and medicine, with their positivist, scientific worldviews, have the potential to combine and disqualify other worldviews, in particular the worldviews of people labelled ‘mentally ill’.

As researchers, we ourselves could be subject to testimonial injustice.  Our research could be dismissed on grounds of being ‘biased’ because we sought our key informants for their critique of mental health laws, a voice seldom heard in the formal literature. We aimed to gather the opinions of advocates and survivor activists on this topic in order to amplify these perspectives, contributing to epistemic justice.

Ongoing debate about coercion authorised under mental health laws is generally discussed by legal and clinical academics and typically centres on when it can be justified and how it can be reduced. Using a snowball sampling technique, we conducted interviews with 15 key informants across 5 different countries, who were known to hold a critique of mental health laws.

Informants thought these laws were discriminatory, caused harm and could not be justified. Mental health laws were criticized for breaching human rights, denying legal capacity, and displacing consent while forced psychiatric interventions were equated with torture and violations of freedom of opinion and expression. Psychiatric abolition was linked to broader movements like prison abolition and anti-colonial activism. Activism was positioned as essential to dismantle coercive systems and create new possibilities for non-violent, community-led care.

Abolition was proposed as a necessary response to the injustices of mental health laws,  involving daily steps toward creating a more just and equitable society.  Our findings showed imperatives to dismantle mental health laws on human rights grounds and to de-carcerate care. An urgent need to consider First Nations or Indigenous peoples’ activism and self-determination as abolition leadership was prominent in our findings. Informants suggested investing in social determinants, community-based care, and peer-led support systems as alternatives to coercive mental health practices.

Examples from countries without mental health laws, such as Thailand and Nepal were highlighted.  Peru was presented as a country that has come closest to putting a supported decision-making regime in place that operates on an equal basis for all citizens. Community-based models like Trieste, Italy, were highlighted, which were founded on social inclusion and human rights. Human rights frameworks, such as the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), were seen as powerful tools for advocacy and reform.

Abolition theory and practice provide ‘hermeneutic resources’ so people can understand their social experience, informing social justice and community-led responses to care. Taken together, our findings provide a step-by-step model for abolition in psychiatry.

To read the full open access article and share through your networks: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160252725000937 

Author bios

Cath and Nina are lived experience academics working at the University of Melbourne, Australia. Each has lived experience of involuntary mental health treatment and detention, including seclusion and restraint, which profoundly shaped their understandings of and commitment to social justice, equity, and freedom. They use these perspectives to consistently critique the ethics and operations of mental health laws. Nina is pursuing a career in law.