Philosophy of Medicine Roundtable 2025 (part two)

This is a brief report of some of the talks delivered on the second day of the Philosophy of Medicine Roundtable hosted by King's College London in June 2025. For a report of day one, please go here.

From the poster of the Roundtable

The second day of the event started with a presentation by Devora Shapiro on the role of EBM (evidence-based medicine) in enabling phenomena such as medical gaslighting and illness invalidation. Shapiro discussed cases where patients are told that there are no medical issues for them, because the test results come back with no indication of pathology, and yet the patient has a complaint that matters to them and is not given sufficient uptake.

A slide of Shapiro's presentation

The discussion following the presentation centred on what causes the problems of power-imbalanced relationships between doctors and patients, whether it is EBM or something else, for instance a failure to provide care or a lack of recognition that, although successful, medicine cannot tackle all human problems.

In one of the several talks by project EPIC members at the Roundtable, Elisabetta Lalumera asked why definitions matter in medicine and how linguistic labels function as operational tools. Conceptual engineering and conceptual choice may serve various goals such as diagnostic utility and inclusivity. One example of the importance of definitions is the change in the definition of pain, which has been revised in 2020 to include the sensations of those who cannot describe pain such as infants, nonverbal patients and animals.

Elisabetta Lalumera on definitions of pain

Such revision was motivated by inclusivity and ethical concerns so it was a deliberate value-laden choice. The new definition has the merit of avoiding the risk of epistemic injustice (e.g. when a patient claims to be in pain but no lesion is found) but has risks as well, being more vague, more difficult to operationalise, and likely leading to overmedicalisation of human experience.

In the next talk, Kathleen Murphy-Hollies, postdoc on project EPIC, presented a talk about what it means to give uptake to the metaphorical meaning of delusions. Murphy-Hollies started talking about the experience of entomologists being contacted by people with delusions of parasitosis claiming that they are suffering from an infestation. How should entomologists deal with these cases? To what extent should they believe the people claiming an infestation?

Each testimony has two aspects: the propositional content conveyed and the perspective conveyed in the statement. We can fail to believe what the person says and yet take their perspective seriously. Maybe delusions express metaphorical meaning that is worth trying to understand. Murphy-Hollies builds on account by Federico Bongiorno and Rosa Ritunnano to explore the metaphorical interpretation of delusional utterances.

Kathleen Murphy-Hollies on delusions

In the rest of the talk, Murphy-Hollies observed how metaphorical meaning is not just relevant to people reporting delusional beliefs, but is often conveyed in cases of reports by people who experienced trauma or have implicit knowledge. This observations lead to a new understanding of uptake which is not just believing what the person is saying but is about mutual engagement.

Dan Degerman talked about the medicalisation of silence. Silence has been seen as a cause of depression (not talking about something might lead someone to become depressed), as a symptom of depression (it appears in the criteria for depression), as a problem in the workplace (underperforming) and as a cause and symptom of depression in that context.

Dan Degerman on silence

Degerman asks why the medicalisation of silence is a worry. Silence is a diagnostic marker for depression and can be associated with distress. But by medicalising silence we represent it as a threat, we end up avoiding it, and we obscure its benefits:

• social benefits
• epistemic benefits
• medical benefits.

More important, we may override the benefits of silence for medical or health-related reasons.

As hopefully shown by these remarks on some of the talks, the second day of the Philosophy of Medicine Roundtable was very rich and addressed a variety of issues in the metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics of medicine.

Philosophy of Medicine Roundtable 2025 (part one)

The Philosophy of Medicine Roundtable was held at King's College London on 2nd and 3rd June 2025. Here is a brief account of some of the talks and posters presented on the first day of the event.

Bush House in London, conference venue

The first talk was by John Ioannidis, "Research results: the false, the fake, the useless, and the untouchables". The presentation started with the statement that "Science is the best thing that can happen to humans". Yet, Ioannidis argued that most scientific research has used non-reproducible and sub-optimal research practices.

Results can be:

• False = due to random error or bias
• Fake = not real, crafted, fabricated
• Useless = not having a meaningful purpose
• Untouchable = impossible to access or use.

John Ioannidis

Problems:

• Megajournals publish too many papers and have high acceptance rates (25-60%). Review is fast and authors pay to publish.
• Predatory journals publish poor science and have an acceptance rate of 100%.
• Extreme publishing behaviour is another threat (researchers publish 60 research articles every year) and get high citation rates in problematic ways.
• Many fake papers are generated through AI and only a few are detected and retracted.

In the rest of the presentation, Ioannidis analysed in more detail the challenges of doing science in a way that produces results that are not fake, not useless, and accessible; and suggested some ways we can improve scientific practices.

In the first break of the conference, participants were invited to look at the research posters. One of these posters was by EPIC postdoctoral researcher Jodie Russell. Russell's work is on intersectional invisibility. You can download her poster here.

Jodie Russell on intersectionality

In the afternoon,  Maria Cristina Amoretti presented a paper about the distinction between values and biases in medicine, co-authored with Elisabetta Lalumera. While values guide research priorities and clinical decision-making, biases are typically seen as distortions to be eliminated. However, this view is too simplistic: both values and biases can promote or hinder medical knowledge and patient care. 

Cristina Amoretti and... Pimpa!

Amoretti and Lalumera proposed a functional distinction: values are explicit, discussable, and justifiable judgments shaping medical aims, whereas biases are implicit tendencies influencing reasoning in ways not explicitly articulable. Values are not always beneficial, and biases are not always harmful. Instead, their roles in medical research and clinical practice need further examination.

In another talk, Elena Popa and Jay Zameska discussed the relationship between social determinants of health and various conceptions of causation. The empirical evidence linking wide social issues such as inequality or poverty to health outcomes justifies the search for interventions on these high-level phenomena. This can be a more efficient way of improving the health of a population in contrast with targeting individuals suffering from downstream health effects. 

Elena Popa presenting

But it is difficult to fit insights from population health science with biomedical approaches which focus on downstream causes and which have been preponderantly used in public health. For Pola and Zameska, overcoming the dominance of narrow biomedical models requires considering a wider range of causal concepts, particularly mechanistic and dispositional ones. The suitability of these concepts can then be assessed by analyzing the interventions resulting from them through the lens of priorities in public health

ethics.

Another break in the conference meant another look at the posters! Themistoklis Pantazakos prepared a poster on the role of biomarkers in debates about pathologization.

Themistoklis Pantazakos on biomarkers

Rebecca Brione presented on the importance of philosophy of language for doctor-patient interactions. In particular, Brione focused on failed refusals of medical treatment. Should the patient have the right to refuse treatment, and if so, under what circumstances? Little attention has been paid to the speech act of refusal itself. 

Brione argued that philosophy of language offers the resources we need to develop a more sophisticated understanding of medical refusal (and similar speech acts), in isolation and in context. These resources enable us both to conceptualise refusal as a normative act, and to understand what is required for a patient to succeed in their attempt to refuse treatment. 

Rebecca Brione on medical refusal

Brione presented a novel account of refusal as an assertion which attempts to add both a direct proposition and presupposed content about the normative landscape to the communicative common ground (the shared beliefs, knowledge and information that form the background for an assumed-collaborative conversation).

The first day of the Roundtable was very rich and thought-provoking, showcasing the variety of issues that can be tackled by philosophers of medicine.

Radical Bodily Doubt

A year ago, I was woken up at 1am by a phone call. The transplant coordinator said: ‘how would you feel about coming in for a possible match?’ By 3am my partner and I were at the hospital. At 7am it was confirmed: the surgery was going ahead.

When I woke up four days later, everything has changed. My body had new lungs in it and my immune system was highly suppressed to avoid rejection. The major surgery left me confused and in complete shock. My body unravelled in ways hitherto unbeknown to me. My recovery was hard and long, with significant complications. I spent many months in hospital, and later at home, recovering. The harsh medical complexities and their effects profoundly changed not only the boundaries, but the very texture, of my bodily experience.

Some days, I didn’t care. Other days I was too confused to understand my predicament. On still others my broken body lamented this undertaking, which seemed endless and futile. The toll on my agency, thought, self-familiarity and self-regard was so total as to force a rebirth of sorts. The restitution narratives of recovery as 'getting better’, ‘returning to how things were before’ or ‘bouncing back’ seemed naive, formulaic and barren: entirely oblivious to the painful reality of a body in total disarray. The anticipated and hotly desired ‘return’ revealed itself as no return at all. As Heraclitus said: you cannot step into the same river twice; both the water and the person are different each time.

Whilst navigating the rocky and uneven terrain of recovery during protracted months of constant, yet varied, suffering I tried over and over to reconnect with this body, which became a focal point of dread, humiliation and distrust. Nothing worked, and nothing could be expected to work without careful medical management. The easy, casual way in which we usually inhabit our body in health was destroyed by an artifice of surgery, medication, treatment protocols, and a restrictive bodily regime.

Extreme bodily trauma requires a renewed encounter with one’s self-presentation and one’s awkwardly distant, functionally dubious and existentially treacherous body. It cannot be trusted but one cannot help but put one’s trust in this flimsy excuse for the grounded, fleshly presence of the past. How else could I proceed?

This led me to go beyond the notion of ‘bodily doubt’ described in chapter four of my 2016 book, Phenomenology of Illness. Bodily doubt is the feeling of doubt in one’s body, that is not simply a cognitive or intellectual doubt, but a feeling of doubt experienced at a bodily level. It is a bodily feeling mirroring intellectual doubt: a feeling of hesitation and doubt, revealing that our sense of bodily certainty and trust are epistemically ungrounded. Bodily doubt is composed of: i. loss of trust; ii. loss of continuity; and iii. loss of faith in one's body.

I now propose a new notion: Radical bodily doubt, described in a short new paper in The Lancet. This is an extreme form of doubt experienced in liminal bodily states, such as end of life or major trauma, necessitating intensive hospital care. Primarily, it is not a state in which certainty about a particular bodily function, such as balance, vision, or digestion is lost, but a complete collapse of all certainty, continuity and faith in one’s body and its ability to persist. It is a breakdown, not of one or some bodily functions (characterising bodily doubt), but a collapse of all tacit beliefs previously held secure by one's bodily certainty.

We need to develop linguistic and other communicative modes to describe radical bodily doubt, and to incorporate liminal bodily experiences into familiar modes of speaking and orienting ourselves towards our bodies. The unspoken experiences of those who are very ill, incapacitated, incapable of speech or even unconscious must be brought into commonly available ways of speaking about illness. As Lucienne Spencer argues, our account of testimonial injustice ought to include a wider range of expressions, including non-verbal ones. We must develop more varied ways to understand and describe our embodied existence when broken or whole, in situations that are familiar or uncanny, and when selfhood is stable or disrupted to the point of implosion.

I thank my donor and their family; we remain anonymous to each other, but I am grateful for their altruism and kindness to strangers at a time of great distress.

Havi Carel is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bristol. She currently leads a Wellcome Discovery Award, EPIC, on epistemic injustice in health care. She has previously published on the embodied experience of illness, epistemic injustice in healthcare, vulnerability, wellbeing within illness, transformative experience, death, and on the experience of respiratory illness in the Lancet, BMJ, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, Journal of Medical Ethics, Journal of Applied Philosophy, and in edited collections.

Toxic Positivity and Epistemic Injustice

 

Toxic positivity (TP) is “the phenomenon of people being positive and optimistic to a degree that is unreasonable in a given situation, and as such makes others feel as if their own (less than positive) feelings are invalid or in some way wrong, thus having the potential to cause harm to the victim” (de Rijk 2025). For example, if one loses a loved one and tries to garner support from a friend who then tells you that you should not be sad because your loved one is in a better place, you may have fallen victim to TP. 

Features of  Toxic Positivity

TP has four features: 

1) appropriate emotion in the victim as a starting point

2) unreasonable optimism on the part of the perpetrator

3) dismissal of the victim 

4) potential harm to the victim 

Toxic Positivity and Epistemic Injustice

I have argued (de Rijk 2025) that TP is an epistemic injustice because it has the potential to undermine knowledge to which the victim ought to have a claim so wronging the victim as a knower (Fricker 2007). Further, this is a particularly sneaky kind of epistemic injustice because it often masquerades as something good, because optimism is seldom considered problematic. Knowledge might be undermined through TP in at least three ways, all of which have their root in the doubt-instigation that is caused through dismissal. 

First, TP can make a victim doubt their belief and genuinely doubting a belief means that it can no longer count as knowledge. Second, TP could make a victim lose their belief because they might think the best course of action in response to genuinely doubting their belief. Thirdly, a victim may lose self-trust, which is a precondition for acquiring and maintaining knowledge (e.g., Zagzebski 2012; Dormandy 2024), although this would only happen in the most serious cases. 

Toxic Positivity and Getting Proper Medical Help

I now argue that TP that undermines knowledge formed through negative emotional experiences related to health can prevent one from timeously seeking proper healthcare. Imagine you are suffering a serious bout of depression but remain highly functional. You confide in a friend that you think you are depressed and need help. But your friend responds by pointing out that you do not seem depressed, you are going about your life as normal and even cracking jokes with your friends and colleagues, he suggests that maybe you are just feeling stressed about an upcoming deadline and when it has passed you will feel better. 

This makes some sense to you, and you begin to seriously doubt that you really are depressed even though you continue to feel all the symptoms of depression. Nonetheless, the doubt sown by TP acts as a defeater to your belief that you are depressed. 

So, you do not seek proper treatment for your depression (because why should you seek treatment if you are not really depressed?) and eventually suffer a complete nervous breakdown. In this case, TP has prevented you from seeking timeous medical help and as a result you ended up in a far worse position than you might otherwise have been.

This is just one way that TP undermining knowledge in connection with our health can prevent one seeking healthcare. But it is sufficient to show that undermining knowledge formed through negative emotions related to health can be detrimental to taking the right steps to ensure that one receives proper medical help before one’s condition worsens. 

Shené de Rijk is a PhD candidate at the University of Johannesburg in South Africa. She is affiliated with the African Centre for Epistemology and Philosophy of Science (ACEPS). Her dissertation is centred on investigating the phenomenon of toxic positivity in the field of social epistemology. Other than toxic positivity and social epistemology (and epistemic injustice in particular), her research interests include applied ethics, especially bioethics on which she has also written.

The Case for Epistemic Justice in Mental Health Nurse Education

When I first encountered the concept of epistemic injustice, I experienced a powerful moment of epiphany.  As a mental health nurse, lecturer and patient, I recognised it instantly. Not just as a philosophical concept, but as something I had witnessed and sensed in clinical practice as both a nurse and a patient.  

Mental health patients are frequently disbelieved, discredited and silenced, often when they are in most need of being heard.  This began my passion to embed the concept of epistemic justice into mental health nurse education.

Nurses talking to each other

Listening Is Not Enough

Listening is a central tenet of mental health nurse education, enshrined in regulatory guidelines and nursing rhetoric.  However, patients and psychiatric survivors have long since complained of dismissal and silencing at the hands of healthcare professionals inflicting long lasting iatrogenic harm. 

Instructing mental health nurses and other professionals to ‘listen more’ is a woefully inadequate response to entrenched epistemic injustice that exists within healthcare structures. This oversimplification ignores the complexities of social and medical power entwined with knowledge creation and exchange.  

Diagnoses that Drown Out Meaning

Discourses on epistemic injustice within mental health services often overlook the role of psychiatric diagnosis itself in perpetuating injustices around meaning making and testimony.   

I have taught students to assess people’s needs, plan care and manage risk. But I’ve also witnessed personally and professionally how quickly clinical language can strip meaning from a person’s story. And when we don’t teach students to notice this, challenge it, and reflect on their own assumptions, we risk reinforcing the very systems that silence the people we aim to support. We must deploy humility and acknowledge that mainstream psychiatric hegemony does not have the answers and has a questionable evidence base at the best of times.

Health education

Why It Matters in Nurse Education

As a mental health nurse lecturer, I believe that if we want to change clinical culture, we must start in the classroom. It is here that future nurses learn how to interpret, categorise, and respond to distress. It is here that they learn what counts as knowledge, and who counts as a credible knower. Are we preparing students to truly hear the voices of those they care for? Or are we, unintentionally, teaching them to privilege professional knowledge at the expense of lived experience?  

We need to create space in healthcare education to explore discomfort, ambiguity, and the limits of our own understanding. We must invite patients and survivors into the centre of our learning not as case studies, but as co-creators of knowledge.

What Would an Epistemically Just Education Look Like?

To me, bringing epistemic justice into mental health nurse education means:

• Teaching students to be critically reflective about whose voices are heard and whose are dismissed.
• Valuing lived experience as legitimate knowledge, not just as supplementary to clinical expertise.
• Interrogating the power of diagnostic culture, rather than accepting it as neutral or absolute.
• Creating space for discomfort and complexity, where not everything has to be neatly categorised.

It is not about teaching students to reject biomedical knowledge, but about holding it alongside other truths, especially the truths of those who have too often been silenced by the very systems designed to help them.

Why It Matters

I wrote this paper because I believe we have a responsibility, not just to care, but to care justly.  Bringing epistemic justice into healthcare means more than simply listening better. It means rethinking how we define expertise, how we structure conversations, and how we respond to stories that don’t fit neat diagnostic boxes.  It means recognising that silence is not always chosen, and that some voices have been trained into quietness by years of not being heard.

My hope is that by naming these injustices, we can begin to confront them. That we can move towards a model of care where knowledge is shared, where voices are valued, and where being heard is not a privilege, but a right.

The classroom is the place to begin.

Jane Fisher is a mental health nurse lecturer at the University of Central Lancashire.  She is simultaneously someone who has used mental health services, and lives with an imposed label of ‘mental illness.’  This gives Jane a unique vantage point.  

She has worked in frontline mental health services, accessed mental health services, and educates pre-registration mental health nursing students.  Jane is an internationally published author, offering a critical perspective on psychiatry and mental health, often using her lived experience to challenge the status quo.  

Published papers include topics such as epistemic injustice, identity, nurse education, and the problem with resilience.  Jane’s personal mental health struggles have fuelled her passion to challenge stigma and power asymmetries within mental health care, whilst shining a light on inequalities, iatrogenic harm and the true value of mental health nurses.

Objectivity, Standardization, and Epistemic Injustice in Psychiatry

In “Objectivity, Standardization, and Epistemic Injustice in Psychiatry,” I subscribe to the view that theoretical conceptions of mental health can operate as structural factors that promote epistemically unjust practices in psychiatric clinical settings. I examine how the high value placed on objectivity, conceived in terms of standardized methods and knowledge, may underpin various forms of epistemic injustice toward patients. 

In particular, I argue that it can lead to treating patients as mere informants or, worse, as sources of information, thereby undermining their status as epistemic agents. This state of affairs should be taken seriously because, I argue, the high value placed on objectivity and its standardized conception are theoretical cornerstones of the dominant model of psychiatric practice and research.

Before the development and adoption of the DSM-III in 1980, psychiatry’s disciplinary status was arguably precarious. The likelihood of two psychiatrists agreeing on a diagnosis was little better than chance, and the antipsychiatry movement had raised serious criticisms of its methods and categories. This was unacceptable not only for psychiatry as a discipline but also for patients, who could receive arbitrary diagnoses depending on the individual clinician’s perspective and thus miss out on appropriate treatment.

To establish itself as a branch of medicine, psychiatry needed to rely on objective evidence to support its diagnoses and treatments. Since psychiatric practice relies primarily on patient reports and behaviors, these had to be systematically addressed as its objects of inquiry. 

This required the development of reliable and (at least presumably) valid diagnostic tools — namely, operationalized criteria — and a view of mental symptoms as objects presented by patients and made observable to clinicians through standardized instruments, such as structured interviews and rating scales. 

From this standpoint, being objective in psychiatry means employing these standardized tools. However, by their very nature, such instruments must set aside interpretations — both the patient's and the clinician's — and disregard patients’ idiosyncrasies.

Given such a high value and standardized conception of objectivity, some clinicians may lack either the skills or the will to engage with information that falls outside the standard (and is thus deemed “subjective”), to take up or engage with patients’ conceptual resources and interpretations, and more broadly, to treat patients as epistemic agents seeking self-understanding. 

Others, of course, do have both the skills and the will. But what must be emphasized is the structural dimension of the issue: beyond individual clinicians’ attitudes lies a fundamental conception — that of objectivity — which underpins psychiatric theory and practice, and which systematically hinders engagement with patients as epistemic agents, instead promoting their treatment as mere informants or sources of information.

"[I]f psychiatry is to be an epistemically just discipline,
it must also find ways to engage with patients as epistemic agents."

I am not arguing that psychiatry should abandon the pursuit of objectivity or that generalized knowledge is without value. On the contrary, such knowledge is essential for making predictions about the course of mental conditions and identifying effective treatments. 

My point is that, if psychiatry is to be an epistemically just discipline, it must also find ways to engage with patients as epistemic agents. This would bring not only epistemic benefits but therapeutic ones as well. What is needed, in my view, is a collective theoretical effort comparable to the one that reoriented psychiatry toward standardization. We must now articulate the conditions under which attention to patients’ particularities and perspectives can also be regarded as objective.

Finally, if this analysis is correct, it has implications for the inclusion of patient perspectives in DSM revisions. While their inclusion will be bound to bring epistemic and therapeutic benefits, it falls short of addressing the complex realities of clinical practice. 

Standardized instruments may vary in how well they achieve their theoretical and practical aims — and in the extent to which they promote epistemic and social practices that are just— but they will always be insufficient to fully address patients as unique subjects and as epistemic agents.

Virginia Ballesteros is Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Valencia. Her research focuses on the philosophy of psychiatry and altered states of consciousness. 

She is particularly interested in how mental disorders and psychiatric treatments are theoretically conceived, and the implications this has — for instance, in matters of epistemic justice, in phenomena such as self-illness ambiguity, or in the adequacy of pharmacological interventions. She has also worked on the philosophy of birth, exploring the epistemic aspects of medical birth care and the metaphysics of the birthing experience.

EPIC Summer School 2026

From July 14th to July 17th, 2026 project EPIC will host a Summer School at Ce.U.B (Centro Residenziale Universitario di Bertinoro) in Bertinoro, Italy. The event is made possible by generous funding by Wellcome, which will also subsidise the delegates' subsistence costs.

Poster of the event

Information about the event will be regularly updated on this page and a detailed programme posted closer to the time. 

The Fortress in Bertinoro

Summer School morning sessions

There will be lectures by the investigators and partners on the project:

• Martino Belvederi Murri (University of Ferrara)
• Matthew Broome (University of Birmingham)
• Lisa Bortolotti (University of Birmingham and University of Ferrara)
• Havi Carel (University of Bristol)
• Rabih Chattat (University of Bologna)
• Luigi Grassi (University of Ferrara)
• Ian J. Kidd (University of Nottingham)
• Elisabetta Lalumera (University of Bologna)
• Michael Larkin (Aston University)
• Rose McCabe (City St. George's University of London) 
• Sheelagh McGuinness (University of Bristol). 

Topics for lectures will encompass perspectives from philosophy, psychology, psychiatry, history, legal scholarship, clinical practice, and lived experience:

• the ineffability of illness
• AI-enhanced healthcare and epistemic injustice
• phenomenological approaches to epistemic injustice in medicine
• the role of dignity and person-centred care in an epistemic just healthcare
• the importance of clinical communication for good and epistemically just medicine
• moral responsibility and epistemic injustice
• legal and clinical approaches to epistemic injustice
• the centrality of agency in youth mental health
• co-design and co-production as ameliorative strategies
• epistemic injustice in dementia, schizophrenia, and depression.

One of the meeting rooms at the venue

Summer School afternoon sessions

EPIC researchers Jodie Russell, Kathleen Murphy-Hollies, Dan Degerman, Fred Cooper, Ellie Byrne, Alice Monypenny and Michael Bresalier will also participate, leading reading groups and discussion sessions on recent journal articles and book chapters.

 

Topics for discussion will include: 

• uptake of delusional beliefs
• vaccine hesitancy and epistemic injustice
• silence and testimonial smothering
• loneliness
• affective injustice
• phenomenology and intersectionality.

Apply!

If you are interested in joining us, there is a form you can fill to apply. The deadline for applications is 1st March 2026 and the outcome will be made known to applicants by 2nd April 2026.

The project EPIC team is looking forward to seeing you in Bertinoro!

What is Epistemic Loneliness?

In today's post  Ramón Alvarado discusses the notion of epistemic loneliness.

representation of loneliness

Often, we think of loneliness as a matter of social isolation. If we had someone— anyone— by our side, we would feel less lonely. Sometimes, we acknowledge that there is an extra component to this companionship. If we, or other lonely person, had not just any other person but a significant other, then we would be less lonely. And yet, we often feel lonely in crowds, in loving relationships, and even amongst friends and family. If this is the case, then there must be something else to certain instances of loneliness that is not addressed merely by the presence of others or even significant others.

In recent work, some philosophers of loneliness have suggested that what it is missing in such instances is a kind of recognition. For some, this comes from a mutual, evolutionarily convenient recognition of kinship. For others, it is a recognition of intellectual and character complexities that constitute your uniqueness. However, just as we saw above and as many highly recognized individuals can attest, being recognized is sometimes the reason why one may feel intellectually lonely. So there must be something else in some instances of loneliness where being in company of others, significant others, or being recognized does not suffice.

For example, many times we feel lonely because we are not “understood”. But this isn’t just us lacking someone we can impart knowledge to or someone that recognizes how smart and unique we are. Rather, we yearn for a conversation partner that can hold their own, someone that will not just challenge our beliefs but that can also help us build new ones. In short, sometimes what we yearn for and do not or cannot have is an epistemic partner—a willing and able interlocutor with whom we can share, exchange, and construct new knowledge. These are instances of epistemic loneliness.

Sometimes we feel lonely because we do not something others do.

While it is easy to think of extreme cases in which this happens— say the lonely genius or the trauma survivor— notice that epistemic loneliness is far more common in our everyday life. Most of us have felt it at least temporarily— teenagers, parents, romantic partners, introverts, academics, uneducated people, etc. In these instances, the loneliness arises because we know something that others didn’t but also because we do not know something others do. This is a very particular yet common instance of loneliness.

Understanding different kinds of loneliness allows us to better understand the different dimensions of this growing and worrying global phenomena. It can also elucidate the kinds of resources most apt to address or assuage it. Understanding epistemic loneliness in particular can help us make sense of the instances in which our loved ones and those we care for seem to lack something other than mere companionship. 

We are epistemic creatures. The acquisition, exchange, and creation of knowledge is at the center of our understanding of ourselves and our place in the world and amongst others. We should know and acknowledge this.

Ramón Alvarado is an Assistant Professor of  Philosophy at the University of Oregon. 

Ramón is interested in the philosophical implications of the design, development and deployment of computational methods and technologies in science and society. 

Ramón recently published a paper in Synthese on epistemic loneliness.

Epistemic Trust Injustice and Distrust in Public Health: Amelioration Strategies

In today's post, Elena Popa summarises a talk she gave as part of the pre-conference workshop “Epistemic Injustice in Healthcare” at the Nova University Lisbon. You can see the list of speakers here.

Trust plays a key role in public health. The success of guidelines and recommendations requires a trusting relation between the scientists making claims about the efficiency of interventions, policymakers and members of the public. Even on the best available evidence and policy design, public health interventions can fail if the levels of trust are insufficient. 

The example of vaccine uptake is particularly illustrative: distrust is an important driver of vaccine hesitancy and if such attitudes are present among a significant part of the population, this can undermine the aim of achieving sufficient levels of immunity within a population to prevent further infection. Similarly, guidelines regarding lifestyle, diet or other kinds of medical advice are less likely to be heeded in a context of distrust.

While there are several sources of distrust, my interest will be on the connection between distrust and epistemic injustice and the challenges it brings to public health and health sciences more broadly. The link between distrust and injustice has been pointed out in political context. As the scientific establishment also functions within a socio-political context such patterns of injustice and oppression can also spill over in scientific practice. 

This, in turn, yields warranted distrust in members of groups that have suffered oppression. Examples include unethical practices in medical research that have affected members discriminated on ethno-racial grounds or the neglect of women when investigating particular health conditions, such as heart disease or illnesses that do not have a clear link to fertility.

While the connection between injustice and distrust embodies a multitude of factors, including material and social ones, there is an important epistemic dimension to highlight. Particularly, if oppressed groups have good reasons to distrust scientific institutions or healthcare providers, these groups are also harmed in their capacity as knowers. 

The term ‘epistemic trust injustice’ thus refers to cases where the conditions that ground public trust in experts, or enable public access to scientific knowledge, are not met for members of oppressed groups. This kind of epistemic injustice is particularly harmful for the members of oppressed groups because it further limits access to needed health services or relevant medical knowledge. Furthermore, from a population-level perspective, the resulting distrust can exacerbate existing health disparities, making it more difficult to act so as to improve overall health.

How can this type of epistemic injustice be ameliorated? One thing to clarify is that solutions looking particularly at health research and healthcare also require improvements in social justice in the background. That is to say, scientific and healthcare institutions are moving away from or, ideally, completely eliminating, historically oppressive practices that have given rise to distrust. 

Assuming this background, more specific solutions involve acknowledging and highlighting structural factors leading up to health disparities, providing health professionals with skills to spot them when working with patients and engage in advocacy, and incorporating input from patients with relevant backgrounds.

First, taking a more population-focused approach in public health, particularly around social determinants of health and upstream causes of illness, would emphasize issues such as poverty, experiences of discrimination or oppression, lack of access to education or decent living conditions. Not only are all of these relevant for health outcomes, but they are more likely to affect vulnerable segments of the population, thus drawing attention to issues experienced by discriminated groups rather than focusing on the needs of better off groups that can access healthcare or expensive treatments with more ease. 

Furthermore, as these problems are more effectively approached through population-based interventions, this perspective is also likely to address health disparities as they do not require conditions that are unlikely to be met among oppressed groups. Through its explicit incorporation of problems likely to affect previously oppressed or excluded groups, this approach may also increase trust with time.

Second, medical and public health practitioners can play an important role in this perspective, as they can recognize patterns of epistemic trust injustice when interacting with patients. As opposed to placing the responsibility on the patients to acquire more knowledge about, e.g., vaccination or asking for blind trust from patients, which is common, health practitioners could acknowledge the problems faced by their patients and advocate for addressing them at the level of society or the health system. The skill of structural competence can enable this shift in practice.

Nevertheless, leaving the solutions to scientists and healthcare professionals is insufficient. Input is further needed by those most likely to be affected by how public health science and health policy are conducted. This can be done, for instance, though patient activism or activism from groups whose health problems have been neglected. Input from such groups can generate epistemic resistance, challenging existing frameworks and producing epistemic resources better suited for spelling out the health needs of oppressed groups.

A final point to stress is that these proposals for ameliorating epistemic trust injustice are not without pitfalls. They are all entangled with further political dynamics; it is possible that some solutions can be hijacked to tip the balance in favor of more influential groups. In order to counter that, a further condition, together with the move towards a more just society, is the closer integration of the goals and activity of experts with those of the patients and the public at large. Thus, ameliorating epistemic trust injustice in healthcare contexts can be done by orienting practices in healthcare towards the needs of oppressed groups within a background where wider steps are taken towards more social justice and integrated health goals.

Elena Popa is Ramón y Cajal fellow at the University of Seville working on a project conceptualizing causality in connection to social determinants of health funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation, and Universities and the State Research Agency. Her research focuses on causality and causal reasoning and values in science, with special emphasis on cultural and social issues in medicine, particularly psychiatry and public health. Her published work includes articles in journals such as Synthese, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science: Part C, and Topoi and book chapters with publishers such as Oxford University Press and Cambridge University Press.

Choosing Health Concepts: A Matter of Epistemic Justice

In healthcare, definitions matter. The way we define "health" is not just a technical issue — it shapes research priorities, clinical decisions, healthcare policies, and even citizens' rights. In my recent article, Health Concepts in Medicine and the Role of Philosophy, I argue that philosophers of medicine have an important role to play in this process. Choosing between competing concepts of health means not just offering better definitions, but also asking critical questions about the goals behind them and whose interests they serve.

Health and wellbeing

Although the article does not explicitly discuss epistemic injustice, the connection is clear. Epistemic injustice occurs when individuals or groups are wronged specifically in their capacity as knowers — when their experiences, knowledge, or perspectives are dismissed or undervalued. Conceptual choices in healthcare can either help correct these injustices or reinforce them. 

A narrow definition of health as simply the absence of disease, for example, can be useful if we want to defend healthcare as a universal right, but can marginalize people living with chronic conditions who still consider themselves healthy. On the other hand, concepts that emphasize adaptation and self-management may place unfair burdens on individuals in disadvantaged circumstances, turning social inequalities into personal "failures" of health.

In this sense, choosing a concept of health is not epistemically neutral. Different definitions elevate different voices — whether those of patients, clinicians, policymakers, or researchers. Some concepts recognize and validate the experiences of marginalized groups, while others risk silencing them. A focus on self-management, for instance, might overlook the structural barriers that make adaptation difficult for many.

Cover of Lalumera's new book

Importantly, the same concerns apply to other concepts in healthcare, such as well-being and quality of life. These are not purely descriptive terms; they are value-laden, and how we define them has real consequences for research, clinical care, and policy. I explore these broader issues in my forthcoming book, Health, Well-Being, and Quality of Life: A Philosophical Analysis, where I extend the framework of conceptual choice to these crucial notions. 

Ultimately, conceptual choice in healthcare is not just a theoretical exercise. It is a site where epistemic justice is at stake. Being attentive to whose experiences are recognized — and whose are left out — is essential if we want health concepts to serve everyone, not just a privileged few.

Elisabetta Lalumera is Associate Professor in the Department for Life Quality Studies at the University of Bologna and she is also one of the partners of project EPIC. Her research applies philosophical analysis to conceptual and methodological issues in medicine.

Digital Age: Mental Health, Cognitive Robotics, and AI

On the 9th of April 2025, Seiara Imanova organised an event, along with Andrew Hicklin, called "The Digital Age: Mental Health, Cognitive Robotics & AI", held at the Edgbaston campus, University of Birmingham as well as online. This post is a report of the event.

Speakers of The Digital Age event

The goal of the event was to highlight just how important the digital world has become, and the ways it’s shaping so many areas of our lives. As technology continues to shape how we communicate, understand who we are, and engage with systems of care, it’s crucial that we pause and critically examine what this means for fields like mental health, psychiatry, and beyond.

Seiara Imanova introduced Lucienne Spencer

The event began with an insightful presentation by Lucienne Spencer (University of Oxford), titled “Social Media & Shifts of Ontic Power in Mental Health”, which explored how digital spaces, such as social media platforms, can act as catalysts for shifts in psychiatric authority. In other words, online platforms like TikTok, Instagram as well as AI powered chatbots, are changing who gets to define, talk about, and influence mental health and psychiatry. Dr. Spencer highlights that although this shift could be considered a kind of ontic empowerment for people with mental ill health, re-shaping diagnostic categories in digital spaces carries the risk of distorting and diluting their original meaning.

Spencer’s presentation was followed by another incredible talk by Alan Winfield (University of Bristol), titled: “The Ethical Roboticist - From robot ethics to ethical robots”. Winfield looked at questions such as what do robot ethicists actually do, what kinds of harm can robots and AI cause, as well as ways for setting an ethical standard and regulations. Perhaps most striking was his demonstration of The AI Incidents Database, which highlighted why ethics was important in robotics, and how AI is already causing harm in the real world.

Alan Winfield's presentation

Last but most definitely not least, the third presentation was given by Paris Lalousis (King’s College London) titled: “Artificial Intelligence in Mental Health: Challenges, Pitfalls, and Opportunities” which is based on the excellent work he does at his AIM Lab at King’s. In contrast, Lalousis discussed the growing need for AI in healthcare, particularly in psychiatry, by highlighting the limitations of current neuroscientific approaches, such as the constraints of neuroimaging, the challenges posed by diagnostic ambiguity and high comorbidity rates between psychiatric conditions. 

Presentation by Paris Lalousis

Lalousis argued that intelligent systems hold significant potential to address these gaps. He presented his study on how the use of machine learning can better predict remission for patients with mental disorders such as schizophrenia or bipolar, and a glimpse into precision medicine.

The event hoped to achieve its goal which was to foster meaningful reflection on both the possibilities and ethical tensions that arise as human experience becomes more entangled with algorithmic and artificially intelligent systems. You can watch the live recording of the event below.