A Defence of the Epistemic Nature of Episodic Memory

According to a traditional view, memory capacities are epistemic in nature: they function to afford knowledge of the past. In the case of episodic memory (henceforth “EM”), the relevant knowledge is of particular events in the personal past. 

Recently, however, the philosophy of EM has witnessed a “non-epistemic” turn: critics of the traditional view claim that while EM has epistemic features, it isn’t essentially in the business of affording knowledge of particular events from the personal past (see e.g., a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l,). 

Against episodic memory as epistemic

Our paper considers three empirically motivated arguments against the traditional view: (1) “the argument from construction” appeals to evidence that the contents of EM are constructed rather than stored; (2) “the argument from error” appeals to evidence that EM is highly error-prone; and, finally, (3) “the argument from animals” appeals to evidence that some nonhuman animals can episodically remember. 

Responses

Against (1), we argue that EM’s constructive nature is consistent with its functioning to afford knowledge. Indeed, it’s doing so provides a plausible, straightforward basis for functions ascribed to it by critics in light of its being constructive (e.g., contributing to planning and future action, social cohesion, and/or an enduring sense of self over time). 

Against (2), we argue that studies of memory error (e.g., m, n, o) fail to show that EM lacks an essentially epistemic function. In fact, such studies identify errors as failures to afford non-accidental knowledge of particular events from the personal past. 

Against (3), we question whether ascriptions of EM to nonhuman animals in cognitive ethology (e.g., p, q, r, s) should be accepted at face value. But even if nonhuman animals possess a species of EM, we argue that humans plausibly possess a distinct species of EM. 

Finally, our paper responds to the concern that if EM has an essentially epistemic function, “disjunctivism”—the view that nonveridical memories aren’t really memories at all—follows, where disjunctivism is thought to be inconsistent with empirical practice. We show that disjunctivism (so understood) does not in fact follow from a view that understands EM as an epistemic capacity. 

Avoiding epistemic injustice

We develop our positive account of EM as an epistemic capacity in other work and use it to respond to  “analytic” arguments against the traditional views, i.e., arguments which rest on thought experiments rather than interpretations of empirical findings. 

One of the advantages of our account of EM is that it adopts a “social critical” approach to EM. Where rejecting the essentially epistemic nature of EM risks giving up the explanatory resources required to illuminate certain forms of gaslighting (or so our in-progress essay argues), our view is designed to illuminate ways in which episodic memory is implicated in gaslighting and other forms of epistemic injustice. 

For instance, by recognizing that epistemic capacities have diverse “modes of manifesting,” our view helps diagnose a key error in what we call the “Traumatic Untrustworthiness Argument” or “TUA.” According to the TUA, experiencing trauma negatively impacts the formation, consolidation, and recall of episodic memories of a traumatic event to such an extent that it is best not to trust testimony based on such memories. 

Among the TUA’s various weaknesses, we argue, is that it hastily infers the absence of a victim’s capacity to reliably episodically remember her trauma. This inference isn’t licensed, for, as we argue, a better hypothesis is that traumatic experience simply modifies a victim’s mode of manifesting her capacity to episodically remember her trauma.

Professor Alison Springle is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Miami (FL). She works on topics in the metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of science of memory, perception, and action. She’s currently working on a monograph which develops a novel account of mental representation.

Dr. Seth Goldwasser is a lecturer at the University of Miami. Seth’s research focuses primarily on skillful mental action with an emphasis on skillful remembering and imagining. He has also written on the ascription of normal-proper functions in cancer biology and on the epistemic status of traumatic memories.

Genocide Denialism and the Epistemology of Ignorance

Last week, Melanie Altanian started a post in parts last week, on her new book, The Epistemic Injustice of Genocide Denialism (Routledge 2024), which is open access. Here she focuses on genocide denialism, prolonged trauma, and retraumatization.

Cover of the book by Melanie Altanian

Denialism, prolonged trauma, and re-traumatization

When confronted with the topic of Turkish genocide denial, the respondents of Kalayjian et al.’s (1996) study expressed a range of negative emotions, including resentment, hatred, and anger/rage, which are appropriate responses to “a perception that the moral order has been violated, with no recompense having followed this disruption” (Miller and Miller 1987, 198). Denial also presents an insult to painful memories, thus constituting a further humiliation that is likely to re-traumatize survivors and force them to silence themselves regarding their experiences.

Survivors may also wilfully suppress their memories, as it would bring back all the pain and terror of their experiences. This may go along with constrictive behaviour in an attempt to create some sense of safety and to control their pervasive fear. However, by avoiding situations that remind them of the past trauma, or initiatives that involve future planning and risks, they “deprive themselves of those new opportunities for successful coping that might mitigate the effect of the traumatic experience” (Herman 2015 [1992], 59). This includes isolating themselves or remaining silent about their traumatic experience.

Importantly, survivors’ feelings of fear, distrust, and isolation are compounded when they are in an environment of incomprehension or hostility towards them and their testimonies. This creates a vicious cycle, as the shattered self “can be rebuilt only as it was built initially, in connection with others” (Herman 2015 [1992], 74). Rendering traumatic experiences intelligible to oneself and relevant others are essential steps towards resolution and closure.

These considerations have cross-generational significance. As a descendant of Armenian genocide survivors who escaped to France, Janine Altounian (1999, 339) describes from a psychoanalytic perspective the “two-fold collective trauma” that is transmitted to descendants and which they must deal with:

[F]irst, the extermination of the descendants’ families and the annihilation of their ancestors’ native land and cultural referents; and second, the dispersion of their parents, escapees stripped of their territorial and linguistic roots and of any narcissistic foundation for their psychic survival, throughout the Western world, in countries where the denials and silences of Realpolitik hold sway.

Altounian draws on her own experience receiving and processing this transmission. The task, she says, requires being “equipped with the psychic and linguistic apparatus necessary” (Altounian 2017, 70). Borrowing from the language of the host culture, the testimony of the descendant thus may benefit from an institutional context that lends authority to that language; “the privilege of his current status […] allows him to live in a time and under political conditions that tolerate his testimony” (73). This marks the role of the descendant as a witness-translator.

We can, then, see how an institutional context of genocide denialism inhibits practices required for successful trauma recovery, thus prolonging trauma across generations, encouraging ongoing constrictive behaviour, and entrenching a range of negative affects. 

As I argue in the book, genocide denialism presents an epistemology of ignorance that weaponizes genocide survivors and their descendants’ dependency on available shared concepts, meanings, and other epistemic resources they can authoritatively draw on to render their testimonies tolerated, credible, intelligible, and thereby effective. The aim is to terrorize them further and to sustain domination.

Melanie Altanian is assistant professor for epistemology and theory of science at the University of Freiburg. Her research focuses on issues in social and political epistemology, moral philosophy, and social philosophy.

Epistemic Injustice and Genocide

For the next two weeks, Melanie Altanian presents her new book, The Epistemic Injustice of Genocide Denialism (Routledge 2024), which is open access. In today’s and next week’s post, Altanian discusses particularly the psychological harms resulting from conditions of epistemic oppression created and sustained by genocide denialism.

Cover of the book by Melanie Altanian

In my recently published book, I argue for two intertwined theses: 

1. genocide denialism should be understood and explained as a substantive epistemic practice, one that creates and sustains ignorance and ignorant agency; 
2. this kind of ignorance is pernicious, because it perpetuates and sustains epistemic oppression. 

I elaborate on this in relation to two interrelated forms of epistemic oppression: 

• testimonial oppression, which concerns institutionalized disabling constraints on epistemic agency qua genocide testimony, and 
• hermeneutical oppression, which concerns institutionalized disabling constraints on epistemic agency qua genocide remembrance.

Silences in the aftermath of genocide

In the book, I stress the need for distinguishing two types of silence that may occur in the immediate and long-term aftermath of genocide – deliberate or resistant silence, and (coerced) silencing – and that it is by focusing on the latter that we get a clearer picture of the epistemic injustices that genocide survivors may encounter.

As opposed to deliberate or resistant silence, where survivors temporarily and strategically remain silent about their painful memories because it helps them rebuild their lives, (coerced) silencing usually occurs under conditions of genocide denialism, where the social uptake conditions for genocide testimony are rendered systematically dysfunctional.

Such epistemic oppression is intrinsically wrong and comes with a range of follow-on harms. In this post (published in two parts), I would like to draw attention to the psychological harms resulting from conditions of epistemic oppression created and sustained by genocide denialism.

Genocide, trauma, and recovery

Particularly as a long-term strategy to consolidate relations of domination, genocide denialism impacts the psychological well-being of both genocide survivors and their descendants. Besides being re-traumatizing, it obstructs the possibility of processing, thus prolonging, cross-generational personal and collective trauma. These trauma-effects have been studied to a great extent in relation to both the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide (Alayarian 2008, Azarian-Ceccato 2010, Karenian et al. 2010, Kupelian et al. 1998, Lehrner and Yehuda 2018).

For example, a study by Kalayjian et al. (1996) identified feelings of humiliation associated with loss of status, autonomy, property, and dignity among the stressors experienced and reported by survivors of the Armenian genocide, while they experienced recalling the deaths of their family members as most painful. Their responses “reflected feelings of helplessness, loss of control, resignation, uncontrollable re-experiencing of the traumatic events, and sadness”, while “the value and emphasis the Armenian culture places on togetherness served respondents as a coping style – sharing the pain and suffering by ‘sticking together’” (92). 

This already indicates the importance of a supportive environment to turn to for coping with trauma, and the above findings are congruent with trauma research more generally. In Trauma and Recovery, Herman (2015 [1992]) argues that traumatic events are characterized by an experience of helplessness in the face of overwhelming force. Such events “overwhelm the ordinary systems of care that give people a sense of control, connection, and meaning” (44). To recover from trauma thus requires the restoration of a sense of agency and control.

While trauma recovery always depends on social support, in cases of collective violence such as genocide, it must include a political response in the form of public recognition and repair. Rebuilding the survivor’s sense of order and justice requires community action, including assignment of responsibility for and reparation of the harms. We can thus begin to assess the perniciousness of genocide denialism, as it upholds the breach between traumatized persons and the community.

Melanie Altanian is assistant professor for epistemology and theory of science at the University of Freiburg. Her research focuses on issues in social and political epistemology, moral philosophy, and social philosophy.

"Trauma is not being seen or heard"

 epistemology 

noun, epis·te·mol·o·gy i-ˌpi-stə-ˈmä-lə-jē

the study or a theory of the nature and grounds of knowledge especially with reference to its limits and validity

Two weeks ago I went to dinner and drinks with members of the London ACEs (Adverse Childhood Experiences) Hub, it was a small group in which everyone came from very different backgrounds and professions including some with lived experience. You can see some of us here.

It struck me that the diversity of our group was evidence that expertise in Adverse Childhood Experiences and developmental trauma cannot be held by any specialty. Nobody can claim epistemic dominance. Like the blind men feeling an elephant and each being certain that the whole creature resembles the part they are feeling, in matters of trauma nobody can claim to be able to see the whole picture. Modern medicine is structured with specialists at the top and generalists (like GPs) at the bottom.

 

The Telegraph newspaper has had a series of headlines recently pointing out that GPs don’t know enough about cancer or antidepressants or anything else. According to The Telegraph if people are sick, they ought to a specialist. These are easy accusations to make and have been news headlines for my entire career and will continue until journalists understand and value the fact that generalist knowledge about the ways different illness interact is not the same as the accumulation of number of different specialisms. There were two GPs at the LAH dinner and drinks, evidence perhaps that GPs more than any other specialty see the ways that biography and biology are constantly affecting each other leading to familiar pattens of physical, psychological, and social disruption. Nevertheless, our medical perspective only captures part of the picture which is why our group includes people working in criminal justice, racial justice, education, community activism, parenting support, and more. We depend on one another to see the whole picture.

A few days after the dinner, I attended an interdisciplinary workshop about trauma with philosopher Havi Carel and a range of speakers including philosophers, literary scholars, educators, and a music therapist. Once again, none of us could claim epistemic dominance. Professor Havi Carel is perhaps best known for her work on Epistemic justice in healthcare. Epistemic injustice in healthcare happens when a professional assumes that because of certain characteristics their patient is an unreliable narrator and interpreter of their own experiences. Consequently they fail to listen to or take seriously what their patient has to say. The only story that counts is the medical history and the only interpretation that matters is the diagnostic formulation. Patients experience not being seen or heard, i.e. invalidation.

People who are suffering the consequences of trauma, living with what I describe as the trauma world of hypervigilance, shut-down, toxic shame, dissociation and harmful coping strategies, are especially likely to have characteristics that professionals assume render them unreliable witnesses. These include being a child or female or trans, being black or other ethnic minority, being neuro-divergent or having a mental illness, having any kind of physical or mental disability, having an addiction past or present, being homeless, having low levels of literacy or educational attainment and so on. Intersectionality matters, so a Black woman with a mental illness and an addiction is subject to multiple assumptions and is especially vulnerable to Epistemic Injustice. One of many valid definitions of trauma that I’ve heard from researchers including Bessel van de Kolk and Jacob Ham as well as survivors is,

“Trauma is not being seen or heard.”

Trauma happens under conditions of overwhelming stress where those affected are unable to talk about what’s happening because it is too dangerous or there is nobody who will listen. They learn to bottle it up and in so doing, increase the risk of the kinds of inflammatory and autoimmune disease that are hugely over-represented in people with traumatic life histories. A healthcare professional represents someone with power who may cause the patient to re-experience feelings of powerlessness, but also has the potential to provide a safe environment and attuned presence. If they feel safe enough, patients may want to talk about what has happened to them. If we refuse to listen or don’t listen carefully enough, then they may experience the traumatic invalidation that they have suffered before, and the potential harm is enormous. Patients with trauma are at greater risk of Epistemic Injustice and suffer greater harm from it.

My own Achilles heel as a doctor is explaining too much. I recently discovered a quote from Donald Winnacott, a child psychotherapist and paediatrician who worked near my practice over 50 years ago and it was reassuring to know that we have at least this in common:

“It appals me to think how much deep change I have prevented or delayed in patients in a certain classification category by my personal need to interpret. If only we can wait, the patient arrives at understanding creatively and with immense joy, and now I enjoy this joy more than I used to enjoy the sense of having been clever. I think I interpret mainly to let the patient know the limits of my understanding. The principle is that it is the patient and only the patient who has the answers. We may or may not enable him or her to encompass what is known or become aware of it with acceptance.” Playing and Reality

In my teaching about trauma, I use a quote from Leslie Jamieson, The Empathy Exams:

“Empathy is asking the questions whose answers need listening to.”

I hope to persuade the doctors and students that I teach, as well as constantly reminding myself that you can demonstrate your expertise by the questions you ask. In so doing we can enable patients to tell their stories and come up with interpretations that help them make sense of their experiences. It’s important to remember that figuring why you are like you are doesn’t necessarily make things better, and may even make things worse, but it is a necessary part of a healing process. Making sense of painful lives through stories is not a radical departure from clinical medicine, but an essential and inseparable part of it. Stories are how medical knowledge is transmitted and ‘how doctors think’ even if we’re unaware of it.

In summary, understanding epistemic (in)justice is essential for trauma-informed care because patients affected by trauma are more likely to not be listened to or taken seriously and are more likely to be harmed by invalidation. Because no specialty within medicine can claim epistemic dominance, they experience what Psychoanalyst Michael Balint described as the ‘collusion of anonymity,’ where “the patient is passed from one specialist to another with nobody taking responsibility for the whole person.”

The answer for me lies in creating a safe environment and continuity of care with well cared-for and respected generalist professionals who can truly listen.


Thanks to Flo, who has been helping me teach this and has inspired me to try to figure this out.

This post is authored by Jonathon Tomlinson who has been a GP and educator in Hoxton, East London for over 20 years.

Jonathon is especially interested in the intractable problems that characterise 'deep end' general practice like complex-trauma, chronic pain and the intersections between biography and biology.

Reflections on trauma

On November 29th, 2023, the EPIC project and the Bristol Centre for Health Humanities and Science (CHHS) convened a multidisciplinary, collaborative workshop involving health practitioners, academic researchers, and students to explore lived experiences of trauma. 

More specifically, the workshop delved into trauma as experienced by clinicians, their patients, and marginalized or vulnerable societal groups, including children, women, and people from socioeconomically disadvantaged populations. To explore these experiences, we were joined by five speakers with expertise in trauma-related research.

In a timely talk exploring childhood trauma, Dr. Maya Mukamel explained how the ambiguous legal and political status of children in some countries renders them susceptible to human rights violations and various moral and epistemic harms. 

This was followed by an exploration of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway, where Dr. Lizzie Gourd highlighted the trauma that can occur during and in the aftermath of war. This fuelled discussion about post-World War II Britain, characterized by enduring scars and a ‘wilful determination for closure.’

Other talks explored how trauma is encountered in healthcare and medical education. In a talk titled ‘The Healing Paradox,’ Dr. Louise Younie explored the role of 'creative inquiry' using artistic practices to equip clinicians with conceptual tools for navigating emotional complexities. She also cautioned against resilience-focused medical discourses, which might inadvertently lead to perfectionism as well as feelings of shame and inadequacy. Alternatively, Dr. Younie proposed an approach centred around ‘flourishing’ and finding creative pathways to integrate trauma-informed care into mainstream medical education.

Echoing these ideas, Dr. Jonathon Tomlinson also stressed the significance of embracing holistic patient perspectives, with greater consideration for intersectionality, lived experience and personal histories. Building on this, he explained that trauma typically escapes diagnosis, manifesting in various chronic and acute illnesses, posing challenges for patients.

Concluding the sessions, Kate Binnie, a music therapist, PhD student, and palliative care practitioner, described the relationship between lived experiences involving breathlessness, trauma, and epistemic injustice. In particular, Kate explained how a body-mind approach, employing song and breathwork practices, can help alleviate potentially traumatic experiences of breathlessness for individuals approaching the end of life.

Collectively, these discussions underscored the interconnectedness of trauma and epistemic injustice, particularly how interactions with clinicians can either alleviate or exacerbate trauma. The speakers unanimously emphasised the need for shared concepts and practices to address trauma experiences, benefiting both healthcare practitioners and their patients.

This post was authored by Kathryn Body, a PhD student in the Department of Philosophy, at the University of Bristol. 

Her research is founded on a multidisciplinary approach, combining insights from social anthropology and phenomenology to qualitatively analyse survey data focused on lived experiences of the Covid-19 pandemic in the UK, Japan, and Mexico. 

Kathryn uses embodied frameworks to create better understanding of the ways people’s relationship with their bodies, other people, and their environment changes during infectious disease outbreaks. She is also a graduate teacher, postgraduate representative, and administrator at the University of Bristol’s Centre of Health Humanities and Science (CHHS).