Showing posts with label language. Show all posts
Showing posts with label language. Show all posts

Wednesday, 22 January 2025

Deaf Interpreters and Epistemic Injustice

Today's post is a summary of Dr Kristin Snoddon's upcoming talk for the Linguistic Justice Society on the 27th of Jan, at 8:00 EST or 14:00 CET. You can register for the talk here


Deaf people are generally at greater risk of epistemic injustice—being wronged in their capacity as knowers—due to not being understood by those around them. In Fricker’s (2007) famous taxonomy, epistemic injustice encompasses testimonial injustice—being wronged as a giver of knowledge—as well as hermeneutical injustice—being wronged as a subject of social understanding. Deaf people also experience the epistemic exclusion which occurs when disabled people’s knowledge is refused admission into the general stock, and are perceived as having reduced moral status.

An example of testimonial injustice, compounded by having a perceived reduced status, occurs when a deaf person giving an account of their social experiences is not seen as credible. These social experiences could, for example, relate to not being understood, not understanding what has been said, and/or being left out of conversations. Hermeneutical injustice can be said to occur when due to other people’s lack of familiarity with deaf people’s social experiences, those experiences are not understood. This is because other people lack the conceptual resources to make sense of the deaf person’s behaviour. As Caponetto and Piazza wrote in an earlier blog post, hermeneutical injustice feeds off testimonial injustice since not being believed and not being understood are mutually reinforcing phenomena.

In my research, I seek to show how deaf interpreters, sign language interpreters who are deaf, illuminate the concept of epistemic injustice. Deaf interpreters often work alongside hearing sign language interpreters and provide what is termed intralingual interpreting within the same target language. In other words, both the hearing interpreter and the deaf interpreter use the same national sign language, with the hearing interpreter interpreting between a spoken and sign language and the deaf interpreter making use of discursive and semiotic resources to convey meaning that extends beyond the hearing interpreter’s rendition. (However, some deaf interpreters, such as deaf Canadian American Sign Language-Langue des signes québécoise interpreters, also provide interlingual interpreting between different source and target languages.)

Drawn hands spell the letters 'L', 'S' and 'Q' in Quebec Sign Language, also called Langue des signes québécoise (or LSQ)
"LSQ" in Langue des signes québécoise, curtesy of Danachos CC BY-SA 4.0

The deaf interpreters’ role is often seen as meeting the needs of deaf individuals who lack proficiency in a named language—such as migrants, people with additional disabilities, and people who do not know a standard sign language. These deaf individuals are at greater risk of epistemic injustice due to not being seen—at least by hearing sign language interpreters and other professionals—as intelligible. From this perspective, intelligibility is based on knowing and using a standard, national language, such as the sign language varieties which are most often taught in interpreter training programs and which have their origins in deaf schools.

Interviews with Canadian deaf interpreter participants described formative experiences that were rooted in deaf childhoods where a sign language was readily accessible in addition to other languages, and where they encountered a broad range of deaf lives. However, as recent work by Haualand et al. (2024) shows, most deaf children today lack spaces where they can acquire and use sign language. Without early and full access to a language in which deaf children are understood, there is ironically both an increased need for deaf interpreter services and a lack of support for the conditions that foster underlying deaf interpreter competencies.

In their work, deaf interpreters fill gaps in interpreting processes and support understanding for hearing interpreters as well as for medical and legal professionals. This support in turn enables public institutional processes, such as medical appointments and court hearings, to run more efficiently. More fundamentally, deaf interpreters see intelligibility where it has been overlooked and construct intelligibility in interaction with diverse deaf people. This enacts justice on both an epistemic and existential level, since being understood opens the door to other forms of justice and new ways of being in the world.

 

 


Kristin Snoddon is Associate Professor with the School of Early Childhood Studies, Toronto Metropolitan University, Canada. Her current research focuses on sign language ideologies and ideologies of understanding related to deaf interpreters.

Wednesday, 23 October 2024

Communicating Ineffable Experiences

On the occasion of the Research & Development (R&D) Conference 2024 on October 15th, Jodie Russell, postdoctoral researcher on project EPIC, presented her work on ineffable experiences and the phenomenology of language to the Herefordshire and Worcestershire Health and Care NHS Trust.

In this post, Jodie summarises the key points in her talk.

Two people struggle to understand one another
Ineffability


Language as gesture

I want to make the case that it is possible for people who don’t themselves experience mental disorder to understand the experiences of those who do, even when these individuals struggle to communicate their experiences. This recognition is important as it may help us overcome some epistemic injustices as a result of assuming some experiences are un-understandable and therefore not worth trying to understand.

To make my case, I argue that we should take a phenomenological approach to language, drawing on French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty for this purpose. On the phenomenological view, language is much more than the words on the page or the sounds that come out of our mouths; for Merleau-Ponty, language is a gesture at the world, which our whole body is involved in. When we speak, we are 'geared' towards the world in a particular way.

For example, when I talk about my cat Fluffy sitting on the mat, I’m gesturing toward Fluffy with my words, in the same way that I might point at Fluffy with my finger. My statement also indicates Fluffy’s ‘presence’; my statement turns us towards Fluffy in our shared world. At my mention, you might look for her or anticipate her to appear, for example, even if she’s actually just hopped out the cat flap.

A cat winking
A cat



The horizon of ideas

My language also implies certain things about me, the world I live in and the nature of Fluffy. For example, I live in a world where cats are domesticated. Her name also tells you that she’s a cat with a significant coat (hence her name) who is well known to me. Language, in the way that it points to aspects of the world, also implies further ideas beyond what we merely see; this is what Hayden Kee (2020) refers to as the ‘horizon’ of ideas.

Importantly, we are aware of other ideas implied by our language in virtue of being part of a shared world. As members of a linguistic community, we all contribute to a stock of shared meanings by both introducing new meanings, changing the old meanings, or reinforcing the old meanings. Which kinds of contribution we make depends on the context (my old saying maybe new to your ears, and thus I may contribute something new – in one way - to our personal pool of shared meanings). Nevertheless, we are, I claim, inherently embedded in a linguistic community and thus our language is (almost) inescapable from this pool of shared meanings.

A figure looks out at the horizon
Horizon


Sharing a linguistic community 

Individuals with ineffable disorder experiences are part of the linguistic community too; they may lack words for their experiences because there simply is no way to describe them in our community. But that doesn’t make their experiences totally incommunicable, I argue. We may just have to understand communication as being broader than words (someone may indicate with their body how they feel, and it is up to us to take up this meaning and try to integrate in into our horizon of ideas).

We must also acknowledge that describing an experience as ineffable is still, itself, communicating some of the experience. We may then need to tease apart the implications of that for other areas of the individual’s life (how they feel they live with an experience that can’t describe, e.g., as a mother, a friend or a working professional) to work around the areas that are more difficult to express.

Understanding individuals with mental disorder to be a part of our linguistic community, of which we are all inherently embedded, is key, I think, to overcoming some of the communicative issues that can arise when someone lacks words for a complex experience, and to gaining valuable insight into what it is like for them to live with said experiences.