Why agency is not compromised by delusional or conspiracy beliefs

This post is by EPIC investigator Lisa Bortolotti.

It may be surprising to realise how many researchers from various disciplines are interested in the relationship between clinical delusions and beliefs in conspiracy theories: on the surface, the former often have bizarre contents and signal a psychological disruption to the person's life that is often explained by a psychiatric diagnosis, whilst the latter seem to be deeply embedded in societal debates, are shared by groups (even by entire sub-cultures), and are not usually accompanied by distress.

In a recent paper, I argue that one thing they do have in common is how delusions and beliefs in a conspiracy theory are received. People who report delusional and conspiracy beliefs tend to be excluded from common epistemic projects. What do I mean by that?

Although there is a recognition that all speakers have a unique perspective and interests, and the capacity to pursue goals and make decisions, exploring delusional or conspiracy beliefs is not considered worthwhile. And it is considered a waste of time and resources to engage with people's goals and decisions of people when these are informed by delusional or conspiracy beliefs. That is because, in the eyes of the interpreters, those beliefs do not just happen to be false but undermine the confidence in the speakers' capacity to exercise their epistemic agency. 

But is this stance justified? I argue that it is not. It is a mistake to think that the presence of a belief that has some characteristics (e.g., a belief that we find implausible but that the speaker holds onto strenuously and identifies with) is sufficient reason to doubt the capacity of the speaker to exercise their agency. Rather, the endorsement of a delusional or conspiracy belief is usually a direct manifestation of the speaker's epistemic agency.

When do we endorse beliefs that are deemed delusional? When we have an unusual experience that demands an explanation. When we attempt to impose meaning on a confusing and distressing reality. When we need to manage overwhelming emotions to avoid an entire paralysis of agency. When we make sense of unexpected and distressing events. When we intend to show loyalty or affiliation to groups characterised by a certain ideology. When alternative explanations seem somehow unavailable or disempowering to us.

There are many reasons why people may endorse a belief that appears implausible to others and yet becomes important to how they see themselves and the world around them, to the point that it becomes difficult to give up the belief or recognise the strength of the evidence against it. But there is no good reason to think that the belief formation process or its outcome are themselves signs of irremediable irrationality or even of a pathology.

As I show in the paper, many of the cognitive biases and psychological needs that have been identified as antecedents of delusions and conspiracy theories characterise human belief formation more generally, though their influence can be heightened in some people due to background knowledge and reasoning style, or to their experience of adverse and stressful circumstances.

What does this have to do with epistemic injustice, you may ask. I think it is at the core of it. Epistemic justice is not achieved when people believe each other's testimonies uncritically or accept that all hermeneutical resources are equally good. Rather, epistemic justice is achieved when all epistemic agents are treated as such, and not as broken records, puppets or sheep: their views are not dismissed before being explored, but they are listened to with interest and curiosity. Agreement is not the goal, engagement is. 

Workshop report: Loneliness, Metaphor & Empathy

Last week, Project EPIC held a workshop at the University of Nottingham entitled 'Loneliness, Metaphor & Empathy'. This workshop featured three talks by Project EPIC postdocs Fred Cooper (Bristol), Kathleen Murphy-Hollies (Birmingham) and Eleanor Byrne (Nottingham). 

The workshop theme reflects some current research interests of the project postdocs. All three talks teased out varieties of epistemic injustice that can arise when certain forms of suffering are marginalised by others. Fred asked what epistemic injustices might be at stake in claiming that certain experiences are inherently unknowable, Kathleen discussed the role of various prejudices in shaping how uptake-worthy we take people's claims to be, and Eleanor discussed the extent to which attempts to empathise with others can result in epistemic injustices.

Fred began the day with his talk The Naked Terror: Joseph Conrad, 'True Loneliness' and the inability to know. Fred discussed themes of loneliness in Conrad's Under Western Eyes where there is an implication that loneliness--or rather, 'true loneliness'--is characteristically unknowable. He gives us the following quote:

Who knows what true loneliness is-not the conventional word, but the naked terror? To the lonely themselves it wears a mask. The most miserable outcast hugs some memory or some illusion. Now and then a fatal conjunction of events may lift the veil for an instant. For an instant only. No human being could bear a steady view of moral solitude without going mad. 

Fred Cooper

Fred argued for a closer historical interrogation of the ways that epistemically  unjust or constraining narratives on health and ilness are sustained over time.

Kathleen then talked about metaphorical meaning and giving 'uptake' to the experiences of people with delusions and various other false beliefs. She argued argued that the content of what people say is often over-scrutinised for accuracy and truth, and that these tendencies are often exacerbated by prejudices.

Kathleen Murphy-Hollies

For example, she mentions how the claims of asylum seekers are often over-scrutinised for truth and accuracy as a result of certain prejudices. Ultimately, Kathleen's position is that even when we highly doubt that a certain belief expressed is true, there are still possible meanings to give uptake to in our engagement with them. Kathleen argued that dismissing those meanings can constitute a form of epistemic injustice, and that giving uptake to metaphorical meaning is a way of engaging with the agents' best attempts to communicate their experiences.

Some members of Project EPIC (L>R; Alice Monypenny; Fred Cooper; Ian James Kidd; Eleanor Byrne; Kathleen Murphy-Hollies)

Eleanor Byrne then closed the day with her talk about empathy. Drawing on ongoing collaborative work with Allan Køster (Danish National Centre for Grief), Eleanor discussed the limits of empathic understanding in contexts of profound suffering. She engaged with recent critiques of empathy which state that certain experiences are too alien, too profoundly catastrophic, to be understood by others. She concedes that some experiences can evade understanding, but maintains that some basic form of empathy remains possible no matter the circumstances at hand. This, she called ground empathy. 

Eleanor drew on a passage by Georg Simmel in order to argue that no matter the profound difference in your circumstances, it is always possible to empathically relate to the other person by attending to the fact that we all share the same existential fragility. Simmel writes:

All the thoughts and fates that make us suffer are actually only the occasional causes that bring about a part of the infinite potential for suffering that is inherent in us. [...] The most uncanny thing is that on such occasions we get the inkling of an immeasurable store of suffering that we carry around with us as if in a sealed vessel; a dark being that is not yet reality, but is still there somewhere, from which fate always releases certain parts, but leaves behind an inexhaustible amount. Most of the time this vessel rumbles quite quietly within us, but sometimes, when a single misery or shock opens it, it starts to move, to tremble dully, and we feel – we ourselves do not know where or what it means – this terrible treasure of potential suffering that we carry around with us that is our dowry, which can never be fully realised, cannot be exhausted by any real misery.

(Simmel 1923, Fragmente und Aufsätze)

Eleanor takes this passage to be illustrative of the inherent fragility that lies within all of us, waiting to be made salient by misfortune. It is by attending to these facts of life, the contingency of our position, that we are able to empathically relate to (if not understand) others in times of catastrophic upheaval, illness and suffering. 

This was the first official Nottingham event for Project EPIC. Keep an eye out for updates and adverts for upcoming events across Nottingham, Bristol and Birmingham.